Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2007

Sharlene Francisconi v. Becky Hall, John Does 1-2,
Jane Does 1-2 : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gregory Constantino; Constantino Law Office.
E. Craig Smay; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Sharlene Francisconi v. Becky Hall, John Does 1-2, Jane Does 1-2, No. 20070331 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/189

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Appeal No. 20070331
Civil No. 040922431
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

SHARLENE FRANCISCONI,

BRIEF

Appellee,
vs.

BECKY HALL and/or JOHN DOES 1-2,
JANE DOES 1-2.
Appellant.

Mr. Gregory Constantino
CONSTANTINO LAW OFFICE P.C.
8537 S. Redwood Road, Suite D
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Ph: (801)530-5050
Fx:(801) -530-1333

E. Craig Smay (#2985)
E. Craig Smay P.C.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Ph: (801)539-8515
Fx: (801) 539-8544
Attorney for Appellant, Becky Hall

FILED
UTAH APPELLATBCOUBIS

AUG 2 9 2007

Appeal No. 20070331
Civil No. 040922431
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

SHARLENE FRANCISCONI,

BRIEF

Appellee,
vs.

BECKY HALL and/or JOHN DOES 1-2,
JANE DOES 1-2.
Appellant.

Mr. Gregory Constantino
CONSTANTINO LAW OFFICE , P.C.
8537 S. Redwood Road, Suite D
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Ph: (801)530-5050
Fx:(801) -530-1333

E. Craig Smay (#2985)
E. Craig Smay P.C.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Ph: (801)539-8515
Fx: (801) 539-8544
Attorney for Appellant, Becky Hall

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

3

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

5

ISSUES ON APPEAL

5

STATEMENT OF CASE/STATEMENT OF FACTS

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

10

ARGUMENT

11

THE ORDER OF JANUARY 19, 205, WAS IMPROPERLY SET ASIDE

11

AMENDMENT WAS IMPROPERLY DENIED

21

ANTICIPATORY BREACH

28

WRONGFUL EVICTION

29

CONCLUSIONS

36

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES
Bankler v. Bankler, 963 P.2d 797, 799 (Utah 1998

17

Breuer Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 723-24 (U. Apps. 1990)

28

Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1254-56 (Utah 1987)

28

Cahoonv. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 141,144 (Utah 1982)

26

Cobabe v. Strang, 844 P.2d 298, 302-303 (Utah 1992)

28

Colonial Leasing v. Farmer Bros. Const. Co., 731 P.2d483 (Utah 1998)

6

DeBoer v. OakbrookHome Owner's Assoc, 359 NW 2d 768, 771-72 (Neb. 1984)

28

Estate of Sharp, 537 P'.2d. 1034, 1037 (Utah 1975)

28

F& FRestaurant Corp. v. Wells, Goode & Benefit, Ltd., 463 NE 2d 23, 25 (N.Y. 1984)

28

Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979)

26

Gilmor v. Gilmor, 694 P.2d 1037,1040 (Utah 1984)

29

Haner v. Haner,373 P.2d 577, 578-79 (Utah 1962)

19

Hurwitzv. D.K. Richards & Co., 436 P.2d. 794, 796 (Utah 1968)

28

Kanzee v. Kanzee, 668 P.2d495, 497 (Utah 1983)

17

Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 87 P.3d 734, 746 (U. Apps. 2004)

23

Kesimakis v. Kesimakis, 546 P.2d 888, 889 (Utah 1976)

17

Kettner v. Snow, 375 P.2d 28, 30 (Utah 1962)

20

3

Lamb v. So. Cent. Utah Telephone Assoc., Inc., 657 P.2d 1304, 1306-08 (Utah 1982)
Matter ofEtate ofPepper, 711 P.2d261,263 (Utah 1985)

17
17

Rees v. Albertsons, Inc., 587 P. 2d 130, 132 (Utah 1978)

17

Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d. 1028, 1040-47 (Utah 1985) ... 25

STATE STATUTES & RULES
§ 78-2-2(4), U.C.A. (1953)

5

§ 75-2A-3(2)(b)(j), U.C.A. (1953)

5

U.R.C.P. RULES
7
15(a)
60

15,18,20
11,22
15

60(a)

12,13

60(b)

5, 6,10,12,13,16,17, 20

4

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to §§ 78-2-2(4) and
78-2a-3(2)(b)(j), U.C.A. (1953).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
All of the following issues were preserved by appropriate Objections to Findings
and Conclusions issued by Judge Himonas (Record at 251-260) and a Post-trial Brief.
Record, pages 714-727.
1. Whether a judgement or order may be set aside other than under Rule 60(b)
U.R.C.P., or after the time limits prescribed therein.
2. Whether an order setting aside a judgement, which neither recites the provision
of Rule 60(b) under which it is granted nor finds that the request to set aside was filed
within a reasonable time, can be sustained.
3. Whether, where a judgement holding proceedings in abeyance following the
Answer is set aside, leave to amend is required for amendments to the Answer filed
within 20 days of setting aside the judgement.
4. Whether leave to amend can be denied upon the ground the request to amend is
tardy because not filed during the pendency of an order holding proceedings in abeyance.
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5. Whether a "remedy" described by the contact as "at the option o f a party is
exclusive, such that failure to exercise it waives a preliminary breach; if not, whether
appellee's preliminary breach excused further performance of appellant.
6. Whether appellant could be properly evicted from the subject realty.
7. Whether an agreement construed to permit one party, by preliminary breach, to
force the other into non-compliance, then claim the non-compliance as a breach, is not
unconscionable and unenforceable.
All of the foregoing are issues of law, reviewed de novo, without deference for the
District Court's conclusions. E.g. Colonial Leasing v. Farmer Bros. Const. Co., 731 P.2d
483 (Utah 1998).
STATEMENT OF CASE/STATEMENT OF FACTS
A judgement incorporating a stipulation recited on the record was set aside in this
case, over objection that doing so violated Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. Thereafter, the District
Court refused leave to amend the Answer to show that appellee's preliminary breach of a
contract for sale of realty excused non-performance by appellant, so that an unlawful
detainer action would not lie. The District Court then evicted appellant without notice or
hearing. On trial, the District Court found, but excused, appellee's preliminary breach,
and entered a judgement for appellee which differed from the original judgement only in
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providing appellee rent, fees and costs accrued following vacation of the original
judgement.
1. In 2002, the parties entered into the Real Estate Contract which is Exhibit 2
referenced in Exhibit "E" hereto, the Findings, Conclusions and Judgement, Finding No.
2. Appellant paid $30,000.00 down on the subject property, and escrowed a
further $5,000.00 to cover potential future late payments. Appellee paid nothing on the
property, but put the title in her name upon the representation that appellant could not
qualify as a purchaser. Exhibit "E", Findings 1,2, 3, 4.
3. Appellant kept the payments current until 2004, when she became ill and
needed to reduce her workload. Exhibit "E", Findings 9, 10.
4. Appellant, in late 2003, sought appellee's assistance in re-financing the
property to lessen and extend the payments. Exhibit "E'\ Finding 11.
5. Instead, in December, 2003, appellee used the fact that the property stood in her
name to borrow against appellant's equity, spending the proceeds on appellee's own
"investments", preventing any refinancing by appellant. Exhibit "E", Finding 12.
6. Appellee then consumed the remaining escrowed funds in further payments,
increasing the equity in the property, and then declared a default. Upon appellant's
inability to cure the "default", appellee declared appellant a "tenant-at-will", and
demanded she vacate. Exhibit "E", Finding 10.
7

7. Appellee subsequently filed an unlawful detainer action.
8. Upon filing of the Answer, the parties agreed to a settlement. See Transcript,
Exhibit "B'Tiereto.
9. December 22, 2004, the parties stated a stipulation of settlement upon the
record before Judge Henriod. The Court sought a written order. Transcript, Exhibit "B".
10. Prior to January 14, 2005, a draft order was delivered by counsel for appellant
to counsel for appellee. Finding 11, Exhibit "C "hereto.
11. No written objections to the draft order were ever filed. No finding has been
made that the draft varies from the oral stipulation.
12. January 19, 2005, the Order was entered as drafted. It holds further
proceedings in abeyance pending completion of the settlement. Exhibit "A" hereto.
13. For several months thereafter, appellee pretended compliance with the Order.
14. March 6, 2005, appellant sought an Order to Show Cause, upon the ground
that appellee had not fully complied with the Order. Record at 27-37.
15. May 6, 2005, in response to the Order to Show Cause, appellee first sought to
have the Order of January 19, 2005 set aside. Record at 89-107.
16. Proceedings were then had before District Judge Dever which resulted in his
disqualification. This matter was then assigned to District Judge Himonas. Record at
175-176.
8

17. January 11, 2006, Judge Himonas set the January 19, 2005 Order aside, by an
order which neither finds any ground specified in Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. for doing so, nor
finds that the request to do so was made within a "reasonable time". "Order on Hearing
of December 19, 2005", Exhibit "C " hereto.
18. The matter was then assigned to District Judge Denise Lindberg.
19. Appellant, within 20 days of Judge Himonas' order, file an Amended Answer
and Counterclaim, with a jury request. Record at 301-312. Judge Lindberg held that
leave to file amendments was required.
20. Among the matters sought to be raised by amendment was that appellee's
borrowing against appellant's equity was a direct, preliminary breach of the contract
between the parties, excusing further performance by appellant; thus, appellant never
became a tenant-at-will subject to an action for unlawful detainer. Record at 301-312.
21. While decision was pending on the request for leave to amend, Judge
Lindberg, without notice to appellant or hearing of any kind, entered an Order of
Restitution, and appellant was evicted from the premises. Record at 386-391.
22. Correction of the wrongful eviction was then refused by Judge Lindberg.
Memorandum Decision and Order, 7/12/06, Exhibit "D" hereto.
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23. Judge Lindberg then refused leave to amend upon the ground that leave should
have been sought while there was in force the prior Order of January 19, 2005, holding
proceedings in abeyance. Id.
24. Upon trial of the matter, without a jury, Judge Lindberg then found that
appellee had preliminarily breached the purchase agreement by borrowing for her own
purposes against appellant's equity, but excused the breach on the ground appellant did
not exercise an "exclusive remedy" to repay appellees' borrowing under a provision
which allowed appellant to do so " at Buyers' option". Exhibit "E" hereto, Findings and
Conclusions, 4/3/07, Conclusions 30-32.
25. Judge Lindberg then entered a judgement that appellant was entitled to recoup
her investment as generally provided by the original settlement and order, but that all
such equity had been consumed, leaving a net judgement against appellant, by "rent"
accruing thereafter, and appellee's fees and costs incurred in setting aside the original
order and trying the matter. Id, Conclusions 44-46.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The initial order resolving this matter was improperly vacated. Appellee never
claimed more than that appellee's former counsel had made an absurd mistake about the
Order of January 19, 2005, which mistake could not justify an application to vacate the
Order under Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., five months later.
10

The District Court then improperly refused leave to amend the Answer, on the
ground that the amendment should have been sought while the Order of January 19, 2005
was in force holding further proceedings in abeyance. Refusal of leave improperly denied
a jury trial. Leave to amend was not required under Rule 15(a), U.R.C.P., in any case.
The District Court then peremptorily and wrongfully evicted appellant, without
notice, or a hearing to determine whether she was a tenant, rather than an owner, of the
subject property.
To justify appellant's eviction as a tenant-at-will, the District Court then applied an
openly unconscionable construction to the subject contract to purchase realty, allowing
appellee to preliminarily breach the agreement, forcing appellant into default, then taking
advantage of the coerced default to declare appellant a tenant-at-will.
In fact, appellee's acknowledged preliminary breach excused further performance
by appellant, leaving the parties co-tenants. The District Court, however, wrongfully
excused appellee's preliminary breach, on the ground that appellants' failure to cure
appellee's breach "at the option o f appellant, waived an exclusive remedy.
ARGUMENT
THE ORDER OF JANUARY 19. 2005. WAS IMPROPERLY SET ASIDE.
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An order vacating a prior order in violation of Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., is not immune
from review on the ground of discretion. It is a nullity, rendered without jurisdiction. Its
reversal re-establishes the prior order. See Infra, p. 15.
A written judgement was first entered in this matter January 19, 2005, based upon
stipulation recited in open court December 22, 2004. The judgement is Exhibit "A"
hereto. The transcript of the proceeding December 22, 2005, is Exhibit "B" hereto. The
transcript reveals the Court's request for submission of an order by counsel. It is admitted
that appellee's counsel received the draft order before January 14, 2005, and addressed
no written objections to it to the Court prior to its execution January 19, 2005.
No appeal of this Order was ever filed. Relief from the Order was obtainable,
therefore, only under Rule 60(b):
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgement shall
be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
No "independent action" was ever filed. May 6, 2005, after pretending
compliance with the Order for several months, appellee first filed a Motion to Set Aside
Order, citing Rule 60(a) and (b). (The Motion was subsequently re-filed October 28,
2005). The Memorandum of Points and Authorities explicating the Motion appears at
Record pages 89-107.
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The "clerical error" asserted under Rule 60(a) (Memorandum of Points and
Authorities, at 8) was that the requirement of the Order that the parties "offer the property
for sale" to plaintiff or a third party (Order, paragraph 3) inaccurately reflected the oral
stipulation "that the parties agree to sell the property". This claim ultimately was not
pursued, for obvious reasons.
The grounds asserted under Rule 60(b) were those numbered in the Rule (4), (5)
and (6), respectively. The Order of January 19, 2005 was said to be "void" for lack of
jurisdiction under subdivision (4), and the incompetence of appellee's counsel was
alleged as a sufficient "other reason" for relief under subdivision (6). Under subdivision
(5) it was alleged that insofar as appellee had refused to cooperate in determining the
value of the property for sale "as was contemplated at the time the parties entered the
stipulation", enforcement of the Order prospectively would be "inequitable" to appellee.
Id. at 10.
No findings or conclusions have ever been entered in support of any of the grounds
actually alleged in the Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Set Aside. There is no
finding in the record of this matter that the Court lacked jurisdiction to enter the Order of
January 19, 2006, nor that circumstances had changed rendering future enforcement of
the Order "inequitable", nor that any "other reasons" for relief, such as incompetence of
counsel (if that ever meant more than "mistake"), existed.
13

Nevertheless, the Order of January 19, 2005, was set aside by an Order of District
Judge Himonas "January 11, 2005", finding that the January 19, 2005 Order was
"improvidently entered". This simply parrots the "Conclusions of Law" also entered
"January 11, 2005". The Order on Hearing of December 19, 2005, with Findings and
Conclusions is Exhibit "C" hereto.
The "Findings of Fact" accompanying the Order on Hearing of December 19,
2005, do not even mention the stipulation (acknowledged in the Memo of Points and
Authorities quoted above) entered on the record before the Court December 22, 2004, and
thereupon agreed to by appellee and approved by the Court. The Findings nowhere
suggest that the oral stipulation stated by counsel and approved by the Court is in any
degree at variance with the subsequent written order entered by the Court.
The Findings instead pretend that the parties failed to come to an agreement
outside the courtroom. This was never revealed to Judge Henriod. The reporting of an
agreement to the Court, or approval by the Court, is not acknowledged.

Rather, the

Findings indicate that following a failure to agree, an order was improperly submitted by
appellant and inadvertently signed by the Court. Thus, the Court finds "that the Order
was entered without the appropriate notice to plaintiff, and "improvidently entered",
without acknowledging the stipulation stated and agreed in open court or the Court's
request for the order, as demonstrated by the Transcript of December 22, 2004. The
14

Findings do, however, mention the timely submission of the proposed order to appellee's
counsel as required by Rule 7, U.R.C.P., and the timely entry by the Court thereafter.
Virtually all of these peculiar Findings and Conclusions were timely objected to by
appellant, without affect. Record at 251-260.
It is unnecessary on appeal to contest Judge Himonas' Findings. It is sufficient to
point out that they are essentially irrelevant to the Order of January 19, 2005, which is
specifically "based upon the stipulation of the parties", which stipulation is shown by the
transcript of December 22, 2004, and otherwise acknowledged by appellee.
Judge Himonas simply chose to ignore the facts that the Order to be vacated stated
on its face that it is based on a stipulation, and that the transcript contains a stipulation
consistent with the Order.
The Order vacating the prior judgment is based upon the fiction that no stipulation
was ever stated, agreed to, or approved by the Court. The Order vacating the judgement,
therefore, plainly states no basis under Rule 60 for doing so. Whatever "discussions"
were had before or contemporaneously with an unambiguous stipulation in open court
and plain statement of agreement therewith, are immaterial. Resort to them to vary the
terms of a plain written agreement violates the principle of the Statute of Frauds. Such
"discussions" are subsumed in the stated stipulation, which is heard and approved.
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Appellee's lone option in seeking vacation of the order was to show that the order
was at variance with the stipulation stated to and approved by the Court December 22,
2004. If it was consistent, the Order was not subject to attack. Appellee did not try to
demonstrate a variance, and Judge Himonas did not find one, because there is none.
Appellee unequivocally stipulated to the terms of the Order.
That Judge Himonas accepted instead counsel's claim to have entertained secret
counter- considerations never expressed to the Court which heard the stipulation and
entered the order, is merely pernicious. It permits any lawyer prepared to dissemble to set
aside any stipulated order he comes to regret at any time, on the unauthorized ground that
it is "improvident".
The parties described in Judge Himonas' Findings and Conclusions never entered
a courtroom or spoke to a judge. That the discussions alleged to have passed between
them outside a courtroom did, or did not, amount to an agreement, is irrelevant. The plain
stipulation, which the unchallenged transcript plainly demonstrates occurred, has never
been questioned. The transcript was acknowledged in and attached to appellee's
pleadings. The stipulation is plainly recited in the Order of January 19, 2005, which has
never been effectively challenged. The order vacated by Judge Himonas is imaginary.
The Order on Hearing of December 19, 2005 nowhere states which subdivision of
Rule 60(b) it applies. If subdivision (1),(2) or (3) are the basis, the motion was untimely
16

and the Order is void for lack of jurisdiction. Kesimakis v. Kesimakis, 546 P. 2d 888,889
(Utah 1976) ("The request to set aside . . . was not timely made, and therefore the Court
had no jurisdiction to set it aside"). Appellee did not move within the three month time
limit. E.g., Rees v. Albertsons, Inc. 587 P.2d 130,132 (Utah 1978); Kanzee v. Kanzee,
668 P.2d 495,497 (Utah 1983); Bankler v. Bankler, 963 P.2d 797,799 (Utah 1998).
Where the actual basis of the order is mistake (whether denominated "incompetence of
counsel" or something else), or any of the other grounds denominated (1), (2) or (3) of
Rule 60(b), resort to the "catch-all" ground of subdivision (6) is not permitted. Matter of
Estate of Pepper, 711 P.2d 261, 263 (Utah 1985); Lamb v. So. Cent. Utah Telephone
Assoc, Inc., 657 P.2d 1304, 1306-08 (Utah 1982). Kanzee, supra. Thus, failure of the
District Court to designate the subdivision invoked thwarts review or affirmance. The
Court of Appeals cannot know whether the motion was time-barred, and the District
Court lacked jurisdiction to act.
This may suggest that some other ground is claimed, and that Judge Himonas
presumes that under subdivisions (4), (5) and (6) of the Rule any amount of time may be
taken, without explanation. The Order, however not only fails to designate its basis in a
subdivision of Rule 60(b), frustrating review, it fails to make any finding that the time in
which appellee moved was "reasonable", as required by the remaining subdivisions.
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The Rule does not subject prior orders to vacation forever. It must be shown in all
cases that applicant moved within a "reasonable time". Here, the record shows that
appellee moved only in response to an Order to Show Cause why non-compliance with
the Order should not be punished. It was plain on the face of the matter that appellant had
relied upon the Order to her detriment, and that vacation permitted appellee to exploit the
parties'disparity of resources.
Further, appellee never actually claimed that she was unaware that an Order
existed, or that her behavior January to May, 2005 was not proffered as compliance with
the order. She can't. She knew of the Order as a matter of law.
Rule 7(f)(2), U.R.C.P., plainly provides that where the court requests an order,
counsel shall prepare and submit one. Thereafter, opposing counsel must object in
writing within 5 days. Absent objection, proposing counsel "shall filed the proposed
order", whereupon, the Court, in the ordinary course, will sign and enter it. Appellee
does not claim that this procedure was not followed, or that she could have reasonably
presumed that the Order had not been entered. The parties made an open stipulation; the
Court requested an order; counsel submitted the proposed order to appellee; the time for
objections ran without objection; counsel filed an order as required by the rule. Appellee
knew that she had stipulated a judgement, and that a conforming order had been
submitted for entry by the Court without objection.
18

Nothing is shown to excuse appellee's failure to move at once if she thought the
Order objectionable. An affidavit filed by appellee's counsel openly asserts that he
recognized the proposed order as a proposed order immediately upon receipt, and
thereupon wished to assert (undisclosed) objections. The facile excuse is that he then
tried to submit objections to counsel by phone, but couldn't get through. See below, p. 19,
N.L No objections were submitted. Appellee claims (and Judge Lindberg subsequently
found) that while appellant remained in the premises in reliance upon an order
subsequently vacated, rent was accumulating in favor of appellee. Thus, the longer
appellee delayed, and the longer she allowed appellant to rely upon the January 19, 2006
order, the more she reduced appellant's interest, while wasting her resources to respond.
In that circumstance, it could not be deemed reasonable for appellee to delay until faced
with an order to show cause.
In any case, the Order on Hearing of December 19, 2005 is wholly deficient in
failing to state any reason why appellee's delay in seeking relief was reasonable. Since
application within the time permitted is jurisdictional, lacking a finding appellee moved
in a reasonable time, supported by credible evidence, no relief could be granted.
The purpose of the rules relating to relief from judgements is not to give litigants a
second chance where they come to regret their bargains. Haner v. Haner, 373 P.2d 577,
578-79 (Utah 1962). Nor do they permit a second judge to disturb a judgement because
19

he regards it as "improvident". The power to relieve is not arbitrary. Kettner v. Snow,
375 P.2d 28, 30 (Utah 1962). Certainly, there is no "inherent power" of courts to relieve
from judgements at any time and for whatever rationale suits a second judge.
Judge Himonas' "Findings" contains the following Finding No. 12:
Mr. Pettey believed that the ORDER was a proposed stipulation which
was different than the parties previous discussions. Mr. Pettey did not believe
that Mr. Smay would submit the ORDER to the Court for signing. The
Court finds Mr. Pettey's belief reasonable, given that the ORDER delivered
to Mr. Pettey did not have a certificate of mailing and had a post it note
indicating that it was Mr. Pettey's responsibility to sign the ORDER and
submit the same.
The recitation that "the Court finds Mr. Petty's belief reasonable", like the correct
construction of the "post it note", is a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. To the
extent that finding No. 12 finds facts, it need not be contested because it indicates at most
an absurd mistake, about the requirements of Rule 7(f)(2) and the nature of the document,
on the part of appellee's counsel. As a ground for vacating the Order of January 19,
2005, mistake could only have been addressed within 3 months thereof, regardless of
whether the court found the mistake "reasonable". Where nothing more than mistake is
alleged, a motion to vacate may not invoke the "catch-all" provision of Rule 60(b)(6).
Pepper, supra; Lamb, supra; kanzee, supra.
It should be noted, however, as indicative of the tenor and quality of Judge
Himonas' decision, that no sentient reader of English could have regarded the draft order
20

as a proposed stipulation. It is plainly designated "Order". It begins: Based upon the
stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing therefore, // is hereby ORDERED.
Mr. Pettey was fully familiar with the fact that the parties had made an oral stipulation in
court, as recited. He heard the Court request a draft order. He knew no further stipulation
of the parties was required or permitted. The document is prepared for the signature of
"the Court". Mr. Pettey's endorsement is sought only under the recitation "Approved as
to form"; it was only this approval which the "post it note" asked Pettey to forward to the
Court. Finally, by affidavit submitted prior to the hearing on December 19, 2005, Mr.
Pettey had admitted that he recognized the document as an order when he received it, and
that the copy he received contained a mailing certificate. Record at 56-68.l
AMENDMENT WAS IMPROPERLY DENIED
If the original Order in this matter was not properly vacated, it prevails, and the
Court need go no further.
Following vacation of the original order, the matter was assigned to District Judge
Denise Lindberg.
1

"Mr. Craig Smay prepared the order which is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit B
and forwarded the same to my office. However, Mr. Craig Smay attached a post it note to the
front of the Order which stated that: ' Please forward to the Court after signing and please fax us
a copy of the signature page'. I attempted to call Craig Smay several times to complain that the
Exhibit B order did not reflect the parties agreement and request several changes be made".
Affidavit of J. Petty, 5/5/05. The Exhibit "B" attached to the Affidavit contains the mailing
certificate.
21

The order on Hearing December 19, 2005 was entered January 21, 2006. It
effectively eliminated all proceedings following the original Answer and allowed the
parties to resume the litigation at that point and to pursue "all legal remedies". Appellant
filed On February 1, 2006, an Amended Answer containing a Counterclaim, and a request
for jury trial. Judge Lindberg then held, contrarily to Rule 15(a), U.R.C.P., that no
amendment, including an amendment of the Answer alone, could be filed without leave
of the Court. She did so over the objection that the leave was necessarily granted by
Judge Himonas in allowing pursuit of all legal remedies: legal remedies could hardly be
pursued if amendment to add them was unavailable.
Even of it were thought that Judge Himonas had not authorized amendment,
appellant did not require leave to amend her Answer because, all prior pleadings
following the Answer having been eliminated, the proposed amendment pre-dated any
responsive pleading, and was timely. Rule 15(a), U.R.C.P. Appellant sought to amend
her pleadings within 20 days of vacation of the prior Order.
Leave to amend, had it been required, should have been automatic in this case.
Nevertheless, Judge Lindberg devoted 6 single spaced pages to holding that leave would
be denied due to delay: appellant did not move to amend her pleadings while there was in
force the Order of January 19, 2005 that "Further proceedings herein shall be held in
abeyance pending compliance with this Order".
22

There is no disguising this. Stripped of pseudo-analysis, the Order of July 11,
2006, was leave to amend denied because appellant did not amend while under order not
to do so. That the latter order was subsequently vacated did not relieve appellant of
complying while it was in effect. Such a ruling is wholly unjustified by Kelly v. Hard
Money Funding, Inc., 87 P.3d 734, 746 (U. Apps. 2004), upon which Judge Lindberg
purports to rely, and which says:
. . . it is per se abuse of discretion for a trial court to fail to explain its
decision regarding a motion to amend with reference to the
appropriate principles of law or the factual circumstances that
necessitate a particular result.
Id.
For make-weight, Judge Lindberg purports to effectively grant a motion never
filed to dismiss the proposed Counterclaim, without opportunity for response or hearing.
The grounds asserted by Judge Lindberg refute themselves.
Judge Lindberg states that "the Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendant hast
failed to plead with specificity the fraud claim, as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 9", without
being able to specify what element of fraud was not alleged. In fact, as carefully pointed
out to Judge Lindberg (Record at 441-464), the Counterclaim plainly states all the
required elements of fraud: a false statement (% 16); intended to deceive fl[ 16);
reasonably relied upon (f 7); actual deceit (f 17); and damage fl[ 17). The first reading of
the Counterclaim demonstrates compliance with Rule 9.
23

Appellants' abuse of process claim is said to be deficient because iC[T]o establish a
claim for abuse of process, a claimant must demonstrate 'first, an ulterior purpose; and
second, an act in the use of process not proper in the regular prosecution of the
proceedings' ", and appellant alleged only that u[t]he present [eviction] action was filed
maliciously and for an improper purpose. In pursuit of such purpose [Plaintiff] has
served process upon [Defendant] to force vacation of the premises". Certainly, malice is
an "ulterior purpose", and serving process (including a summons) for the improper
purpose of taking advantage of appellee's preliminary breach to force appellant's eviction
is "an act in the use of process not proper".
Judge Lindberg's undescribed qualifications about the propriety of a claim of
anticipatory breach of contract are disposed of in entirety by the fact that, when she
finally heard the evidence, she found anticipatory breach of contact.
The grounds recited by Judge Lindberg for refusing leave to amend are inadequate
on their face. At the same time, it must be observed that the proposed amendment sought
jury trial. Denial of leave denied a trial by jury, and left decision wholly in Judge
Lindberg's hands whether appellant had ever been a tenant-at-will, and whether she had
been properly evicted.

24

UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACT /LACK OF CONSIDERATION
The contract enforced by the District Court is unconscionable, and unenforceable
on its face. Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d. 1028, 1040-47 (Utah
1985).
Judge Lindberg found that appellee had the right under the Contract both to make
payments out of the escrow without declaring a default, then accept further direct
payments, then expend the remainder of the escrow, and to thereafter declare a default for
the first payment made out of escrow. The District Court accorded appellee a right to
affix further liens against the title for appellee's personal benefit, frustrating appellant's
ability to perform the Contract by refinancing/selling, and to then declare a default for
failure of the very performance frustrated. Appellee, thus, reserved an unlimited right to
define her own performance and a right to arbitrarily terminate, rendering any
consideration wholly illusory. Id. 706-P.2d. at 1036-1040.
The result, according to the District Court, was that, in December, 2003, appellee
could borrow against the property for personal "investments", frustrating appellant's
ability to refinance/sell the property or to make further payments except from escrow.
Appellee could then, without declaring a default, spend all remaining escrow funds on a
series (April, May, June, 2004) of payments, and finally, in July, 2004, declare a default
for failure to make the first (April, 2004) of such payments (as well as a payment out of
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escrow in 2002) except from escrow. Thereupon, appellee was entitled to seize and
forfeit all of appellant's equity, as then augmented by the whole escrow, notwithstanding
appellee had then invested nothing and taken no risk whatever. This was said to be
authorized by a provision of the Escrow Agreement which, in fact, says that a default in
payments is not "cured" by a payment from escrow where appellee then declares a
default, and exercises a remedy available to her. This provision says nothing about
whether exercise of a remedy for an alleged default is waived where appellee pays out of
escrow, then accepts further payments.
Nothing in the Contract or Escrow Agreement suggests that appellee could make a
payment out of appellant's escrowed funds, then accept further payments, without
waiving the default, or later claim a default due to non-payment. One party to a contract
cannot frustrate performance by the other, then assert the frustrated performance as a
default. E.g., Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 141,144 (Utah 1982); Ferris v. Jennings, 595
P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979). Appellee did not have the option of passing an alleged
"default", allowing appellant to accumulate further equity, then seizing the additional
equity on the ground of the prior "default".
The "no waiver" provision of section 5 of the Contract simply means that
acceptance of a "late" payment does not commit plaintiff to accept future late payments;
it says nothing about the effect of acceptance of a late payment followed by further
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payments.

Acceptance of a payment out of the escrow without declaring a default,

followed by further direct payments, clearly waived any claim about that payment.
Plaintiff, for example, could not pay the June, 2002, payment out of escrow, accept two
more years of payments, then declare a default over the June, 2002, payment.
The Contract as construed by the District Court, is both substantively and
procedurally unconscionable, and lacking consideration, under the rules set out in
Resource Management Co., supra. The obvious purpose of the Contract, as enforced,
was to lure appellant into investing her funds in a property unneeded and unaffordable,
then manufacture a default, allowing appellee to seize the investment without expending
a penny, or taking a risk, or providing any benefit to appellant. Appellee could then resell the property, pocketing defendant's investment, or retain the property at a discount in
price of about one-third.
Not only are the positions of the parties to such a contract wholly imbalanced as to
benefits achievable and risks taken, the Contract, as enforced, permits appellee to force
appellant into default, then declare a forfeiture.

The Contract, thus construed is

substantively and procedurally unconscionable, and without consideration. It is
unenforceable.
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ANTICIPATORY BREACH
Appellee anticipatorily breached the Contract. The Contract is simply one to buy and sell
realty. It escrows the deed bargained for to abide completion. Contract §§ 11, 22; Supplemental
Escrow Instructions. Appellee covenanted to keep the title clear. Contract, § 9. The contract is
specifically integrated, and excludes oral variations, or side agreements, such as an alleged oral
side agreement requiring defendant to refinance in one year. Contract, § 22. It expressly makes
time of the essence. Contract, § 15.
The effect of such an agreement is that the buyer becomes the "equitable owner" of the
subject property, and seller holds the legal title in trust for buyer to assure payment. Butler v.
Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1254-56 (Utah 1987); In re Estate of Sharp, 537 P.2d. 1034, 1037
(Utah 1975). Escrow of a deed under such contract constitutes an agreement that buyer shall
have unobstructed access to buyer's equity to refinance as desired. See Contract, § 1 1 . This
requires the seller to keep the title free and clear of further liens at all times. E.g., DeBoer v.
Oakbrook Home Owner's Assoc, 359 NW 2d 768, 771 -72 (Neb. 1984); F& F Restaurant Corp.
v. Wells, Goode & Benefit, Ltd, 463 NE 2d 23, 25 (N.Y. 1984).
For seller in such case to further encumber the title to buyer's disadvantage breaches the
agreement. Id. Such breach constitutes anticipatory breach under Utah law, because it declares
seller's intent not to preform as required- by keeping the tittle clear- when performance is due,
namely, at all times.

It renders useless buyer's further

attempts to perform by

refinancing/selling. Eg., Hurwitz v. O.K. Richards & Co., 436 P.2d. 794, 796 (Utah 1968);
28

Breuer Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 723-24 (U. Apps. 1990); Cobabe v. Strang, 844
P.2d 298, 302-303 (Utah 1992). Appellee's breach prevented appellant's next performance; then
appellee declared a default for failure of such performance, terminating the Contract. This ended
any prospect that appellee would ever perform.

Appellee's anticipatory breach entitled

defendant then and there to, among other things, declare the Contract terminated, and to seek
damages. Id.
Wrongful Eviction.
The proposed amendment and subsequent proceedings thereon fully informed Judge
Lindberg that appellant alleged that she had not breached the parties' Real Estate
Contract, because it was conceded that she had fully performed to the point of appellee's
admitted imposition of further liens in direct violation of a specific contract prohibition.
Thus, appellant never became a tenant at will under the contract, could not be charged
with failure to pay rent, and could not have been in unlawful detainer. Indeed, under the
terms of the contract, appellant was a co-tenant of the subject property, who could not be
charged for its use. See, e.g, Gilmor v. Gilmor, 694 P.2d 1037,1040 (Utah 1984).
While the issue of amendment of appellant's pleadings was pending, appellee filed
an Ex Parte Motion for Restitution. While Judge Lindberg first returned the motion
unsigned, it was subsequently re-submitted and signed without notice to appellant or
hearing of any kind. Appellant was then evicted from the subject premises. Judge
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Lindberg subsequently explained the handling of this matter in her ruling on leave to
amend as follows:
As a result of the Order of Restitution Defendant was evicted from
the premises on or about June 14, 2006. By letter to the Court
Defendant's counsel objected that he had not received adequate
notice that the Order of Restitution would be submitted to the Court.
After receiving Defendant's objection, the Court reviewed the entire
file and noted that there probably had been irregularity in how the
Order of Restitution was handled. It appears that the Order of
Restitution previously sought by plaintiff on April 24, 2006 and
denied by the Court because the case was on emergency appeal, was
returned to plaintiffs counsel instead of being filed unsigned as a
part of record. Thereafter, when the Court denied an earlier Rule
54(b) certification request file by Defendant, Plaintiffs counsel
resubmitted the same Order of Restitution for the Court's signature
without providing new notice to Defendant's counsel. In the Court's
view this was a procedural irregularity that should not have occurred.
However, prior to signing the re-submitted Order of Restitution, the
Court verified that Defendant had never posted the counter-bond
required to remain in possession of the premises. At the June 23,
2006 hearing the Court concluded that the failure of notice of
defense counsel was harmless error because the Order of Restitution
would still have been signed by the Court even if proper notice had
been given. Defendant had been on notice that she needed to post
the bond amount set by the Court if she wished to remain in the
premises during pendency of the case. By failing to post bond
Defendant subjected herself to the probability of eviction prior to the
resolution of the parties' competing claims. Accordingly, the Court
re-affirmed the issuance of the Order of Restitution
Exhibit "D" hereto, Memorandum Decision and Order, 7/12/06, at 3, n.6. Presumably,
this rationale reflects the provision of § 78-36-8.5(3), U.C.A. (1953) that plaintiff "shall
be granted an order of restitution".
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The difficulty with this is the obvious one: unless and until it was determined that
appellant had violated the parties' contract for purchase of real estate, and thereby
become a tenant-at-will, it could not be determined that an unlawful detainer action was
proper. See § 78-36-9, U.C.A. (1953). Appellant was presumptively the equitable owner
of the property. Appellee's subsequently adjudicated preliminary breach excused further
performance by appellant. See below. Appellant never became a tenant-at-will, never
owed rent, and could never have been required to file a counter bond. This determination
could only be made "upon the merits or upon default". § 78-36-10(1), U.C.A. (1953). No
default had occurred.
Judge Lindberg simply sailed right by this difficulty, however, by presuming in
advance, without hearing or evidence of any kind, that appellant had been properly
declared a tenant-at-will:
As authorized by the parties' agreement, when Defendant did not
cure the default after receiving notice thereof, Plaintiff declared
Defendant a tenant-at-will and gave her a five day notice to vacate
the premises.
Memorandum Decision and Order, 7/12/06, at 1. The Court, being advised of a complete
defense, simply presumed a "default" without evidence or hearing. There was no default.
As the Court was ultimately forced to recognize, there was a plain, preliminary breach.
Appellant was never properly required to vacate.
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Failure to file a counter bond was never an excuse for eviction absent a showing of
any kind of actual default making appellee a tenant-at-will.
On the other hand, to defend the improperly issued order of restitution, it became
necessary upon trial for Judge Lindberg to find an excuse for appellee's plain anticipatory
breach. This is discussed below.
Failure to file a bond could not have been an excuse for finding without hearing that
appellant was a tenant-at-will. §§ 78-36-9, 78-36-10(1), U.C.A. (1953). The eviction of
appellant relies entirely upon the acknowledged procedural deficiency of failure to
provide notice or hold a hearing. A hearing would have disclosed a preliminary breach
by appellee. Indeed, subsequent trial did so disclose. Thus, appellant was never in
default, and had never properly been declared a tenant-at-will.
The statement in Judge Lindberg's Order of July 11, 2006 pre-ordained the result
when Judge Lindberg did finally provide a hearing. The improper* eviction could not be
defended unless the Court at trial found that appellant had defaulted, and properly been
declared a tenant-at-will.
Upon trial, Judge Lindberg was forced to acknowledge that appellee preliminarily
breached the contract. Findings Nos.12, 20. Rather than concede however, that appellant
was never a tenant-at-will, or that the entire proceeding by which she was evicted was
improper, Judge Lindberg then avoided that unhappy result by holding that appellant had
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waived, by not exercising, the "exclusive remedy" for preliminary breach established by
the contract. Conclusions Nos. 30-32.
Challenged to identify the contract language making paying off appellee's improper
borrowing appellant's exclusive remedy for imposition of a further lien, the District Court
cited Section 9 - omitting, however, the first two sentences. In entirety, the provision is
as follows:
Except for the liens and encumbrances set forth above, Seller
covenants to keep the property free and clear of liens and
encumbrances arising from the acts of the Seller. So long as Buyer is
current hereunder, Seller agrees to keep current the payments on all
obligations to which Buyer's interest is subordinate. Should Seller
default on the foregoing covenants on any one or more occasions,
Buyer may, at Buyer's option, in whole or in part, make good
Seller's default to Seller's obligee, and deduct all expenses so paid
from future payments to Seller, and Seller shall credit all Buyer's
sums so expended to the indebtedness herein created just as if
payments had been made directly to Seller under provisions of
Section 4 above.
The so-called remedy under this provision is, by its express terms, not only not
exclusive, it does not apply to the anticipatory breach found in this case.
This provision plainly refers to two different covenants of Seller: (1) to "keep the
property free and clear of [additional] liens and encumbrances" by Seller, and (2) to keep
current on all encumbrances, including the original mortgage, affecting Buyer's interest.
Breach of the first covenant simply requires the imposition of a further lien; breach of this
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covenant occurs notwithstanding the new lien is kept current. Breach of the second
covenant requires default on the underlying lien. Compliance with the second covenant
does not eliminate breach of the first covenant.
An "option" for curing "Seller's default to Seller's obligee", therefore, applies only
to the second covenant. There need be no default to Seller's obligee for breach of the first
covenant. It is simply a device, strictly at Buyer's option, allowing Buyer to protect her
position from foreclosure by substituting as obligor for Seller. Curing "Seller's default to
Seller's obligee" cannot remedy a breach of covenant which does not involve "Seller's
default to Seller's obligee".
This cannot mean that there is no remedy for Seller's breaching the first covenant
by imposing a further lien. Such a breach imperils Buyer's equity and interferes with
Buyer's performance. Buyer does not need to wait for Seller to default on the new lien to
seek a remedy. The remedies available at law include immediate termination. Hurwitz v.
D.K. Richards & Co., 436 P.2d 794, 796 (Utah 1968); Breuer Harrison Inc. v. Combe.
799 P.2d 716, 723-24 (U. Apps. 1990); Cobabe v. Strang, 844 P.2 298, 302-03 (Utah
1992).
The provision is not even an exclusive remedy for breach of the second covenant. It
is merely optional. Nothing in the contract suggests that if Seller does not keep the
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underlying mortgage current, Buyer may not let the property go to foreclosure and seek to
retrieve the equity or to buy in the property, and recover any damages from Seller.
Further, the District Court's reading of Section 9 is unconscionable on its face. It is
acknowledged that appellee's improper borrowing eliminated appellant's equity, and
prevented appellant re-financing the property in order to maintain her obligation under the
contract. Plainly, that was its purpose. Having eliminated appellant's ability to refinance and, thus, appellant's ability to perform her obligations, appellee also eliminated
the "exclusive remedy" of "making good Seller's default to Seller's obligee". Appellant
could no more refinance to pay appellee's debt than she could to pay her own. It is well
established that an agreement which allows one party to force the other into default, then
take advantage of it, is per se unconscionable and unenforceable. Resource Management
Co. v. Western Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1040-47 (Utah 1985). An agreement, in which an
act of breach eliminates the "exclusive remedy" for the breach, is equally unenforceable.
Id, Cahoon v. Cahoon, 640 P.2d 141, 144 (Utah 1982); Ferris v. Jennings, 585 P.2d 857,
859 (Utah 1979).
The District Court found an "exclusive remedy" in defiance of the plain contract
language because there was no other way to avoid the effect of anticipatory breach.
Acknowledging the otherwise obvious anticipatory breach required a finding that
appellant's performance was thereafter excused. Appellant never breached the contract,
35

never became a tenant-at-will, and could never have been evicted. The finding of an
exclusive remedy was the essential justification for the District Court's prior eviction
without notice or hearing.
The inescapable fact in this case is that before appellee could obtain any relief on
an unlawful detainer claim, she had to show that appellant had breach the parties'
agreement and become a tenant-at-will. This was always denied, and it was always
asserted that appellee had preliminarily breached the agreement, excusing appellant's
performance, failure of which was asserted as default. In short, to obtain appellant's
eviction, appellee had to overcome the allegation of preliminarily breach. Appellee never
could.
Meanwhile, the District Court had presumed appellant's default without hearing,
and peremptorily evicted her. When appellant objected, the Court refused to correct the
obvious error, and settled instead upon a course which included keeping the decision in
its own hands, and finding a default by appellant regardless of the contract language.
CONCLUSIONS
The Order of January 19, 2005, must be reinstated, because it was vacated in
violation of Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P.
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The Judgment against appellant, including her eviction, must be reversed and vacated
in entirety. Appellant never violated the Contract, nor became a tenant-at-will. Appellee
preliminarily violated the Contract.
Appellant's right to pursue her claim against appellee for abuse of proceedings and
wrongful eviction must be preserved.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 29th day of August, 2007.

E. Craig
Attorney for
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

SHARLENE FRANCISCONL
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Number: 040922431EV

BECKY HALL and/or JOHN DOES 1-2,
JANE DOES 1-2.

Judge: Dever

Defendants.

Based upon the stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1.

The parties shall promptly exchange all information available to them showing- sums
paid by defendant Hall for the purchase or improvement of the subject realty located
at 1131 E. Electra Lane, Sandy, UT 84094. The parties shall endeavor to agree
upon a total sum paid by Hall. In the event that they are unable to agree, they may
apply to the Court for further resolution.

2.

The parties shall promptly obtain a qualified appraisal of the subject property. Each
party may engage an appraiser. In the event that the parties are unable to agree on

an appraised value of the property, or to offer the property for sale at the higher
appraisal obtained, the parties may apply to the Court for further resolution.
3.

Upon determination of the value of the subject property pursuant to paragraph two
hereof, the parties shall offer the property for sale at such price.

4.

The terms of such sale shall be commercially reasonable; provided, however, that the
sale must obtain sufficient immediate funds to pay at least the interest of defendant
Hal! defined herein.

5.

Defendant Hall shall be paid from the proceeds of such sale that proportion of the
selling price as equals the part of the selling price from plaintiff to defendant
represented by the amount determined under paragraph one hereinabove. Plaintiff
shall be entitled to the remainder of such proceeds, subject to discharge of any prior
obligations which plaintiffhas lodged against the property.

6.

The parties shall cooperate fully to accomplish the purposes hereof and shall provide
all documentation including appropriate conveyances therefore.

7.

Further proceedings herein shall be held in abeyance pending compliance with this
Order. The parties shall report their progress hereunder to the Court no later than
the end of January, 20.05.

DATED this

of January, 2005.

Approved as to Form:

BY THE COURT:

Jax H. Pettey
Honorable Stephen Henriod
.-<• C^

E. Craig Smay

\

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the /
of January, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing " ORDER" to be mailed by U.S. mail, first-class postage prepaid, to:

Jax H. Pettey (#2594)
PETTY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
9488 Union Square
Sandy, UT 84070
Ph: (801) 984-0055
Fx:(801) 984-0040
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on December 22, 2004)
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MR. SMAY: Your Honor, I f m Craig Smay.
first appearance in your Court.

This is my

I should say I'm honored to be

5

here.

6

a property purchased with funds by Ms. Hall —

7

funds of Ms. Hall, but taken in the name of Ms. Francis coni.

8

I think that the proper resolution of this,

Q

/ •>-

t o Mr.

This is No. 3, Francisconi vs. Hall.

P

.•- *- — .-

:y c o r r e c t i n g me, is

The case involves
or largely with

subject

t h a t t h e p a r t i e s a g r e e L-C s e i i

10

t h e p r o p e r t y , t o t a k e t h e e q u i t y which b e l o n g s t o Ms . H a l l

11

and p a y t h a t , and i f Ms. F r a n c i s c o n i wants t o keep t h e

12

thereafter,

that's

f i n e ; or s e l l i t t o a t h i r d p a r t y ,

out

house
that's

13 I f i n e
14

We agree t h a t p a r t of t h e funds t h a t have gone

into

15

t h e p r o p e r t y , for example, a $30,000 down payment f o r Ms.

16

b u t t h e r e i s as y e t some u n r e s o l v e d d i s p u t e as t o

17

payments .

18

Hall,

remaining

So what we a r e p r o p o s e d t o do would he t o d e f e r

any

19

f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s u n t i l we' ve had an o p p o r t u n i t y t o

20

s u c h a c c o u n t s as we h a v e r e g a r d i n g t h e f u r t h e r p a y m e n t s , a n d we

21

t h i n k t h a t t h o s e s h o u l d be complete enough t o a r r i v e a t a f i n s i

22

f i g u r e about what Ms. H a l l p u t i n t o

23

exchange

it.

In the meantime, have the house appraised so

we can

24

make a current assessment of value.

Then if Ms. Francisconi

25

wants to pay Ms. Hall her proportionate share-of the value

J

EXHIBIT

B.

1 I b a s e d upon t h e e q u i t y ,

that's fine.

I f t h e y want t o p u t

the

2

h o u s e up for s a l e t o a t h i r d person and t a k e t h e money o u t ,

3

that's

4

C o u r t about any of t h a t i n due c o u r s e .

fine.

We' d he p r e p a r e d t o come hack and r e p o r t t o

5

THE COURT: Mr.

6

MR. PETTEY: That i s B a s i c a l l y t h e a g r e e m e n t ,

7

Honor.

the

Pettey?

We would ask t h a t t h e Court t o i s s u e an o r d e r

your
releasing

t h e $2,700 t h a t ' s been p a i d i n by Ms. F r a n c i s c o n i f o r h a l f
9

of

t h e bond.

10

THE COURT: I d o n ' t suppose Mr. Smay would o b j e c t t o

u

MR. SMAY: We have no o b j e c t i o n t o t h a t , your Honor.

12

THE COURT: A l l r i g h t , then.

That w i l l be t h e

order.

13

A p p r e c i a t e your work i n t r y i n g t o r e s o l v e t h i s , and w e ' l l

14

t h i s continued without date to hear from e i t h e r of you a t s u c h

15

t i m e as we need f u r t h e r Court h e a r i n g .

16

MR. "PETTEY: Thank you, your Honor.

17

MR. SMAY: Would your Honor l i k e a w r i t t e n r u l i n g

IB

THE COURT: I think t h a t would be good f o r t h e

20

MR. SMAY: A l l

21

. •

22
23

leave

of

any kind or —

19

it

file.

right.

THE COURT: L e t ' s memorialize t h e aareetient tod~y.
MR. SMAY: A l l r i g h t .

to Mr. Jax.

I ' l l prepare i t and t h e n submit

Would that be fine?
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MR. PETTEY: Okay, thank you.

25

{Hearing concluded)

it

F2LEE BiSTBIG? COURT
Third Judicial District

JAN
SALT LAKE COUNT;

By.

Deputy/perk

Oregon,' M Constantino, (A 6853)
CONSTANTINO LAW OFFICE, P.C.
8539 S Redwood Rd., Suite D
West Jordan, Utah 84084
(801)748-4747
FAX: (801) 748-4713
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SHARLENE FRANCISCONL
DECEMBER 19, 2005
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No.: 040922431 EV

BECKY HALL, an individual, and/or JOHN
DOES 1-2, JANE DOES 1-2,

Judge: Deno Himonas

Defendants,

The above-entitled matter came on for evidentiary hearing on December 19, 2005, at 1:30
p.m. before the Hon. Deno Himonas. Plaintiff SHARLENE FRANCISCONI was present and
represented by her attorney, Gregory M. Constantino. Defendant BECKY HALL was present
and represented by her attorney, Craig Smay. The Court heard the testimony of Jax Pettey,
Becky Hall, and Kim Atkin, and received certain documents into evidence. The Court heard and

!
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EXHIBIT

considered the arguments of counsel for the parties. The Court, having previously entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and now, for good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED THAT:
1.

The ORDER entered by the Court on January 19, 20055 was improvidently
entered and the ORDER should be vacated and set aside.

' 2.

The parties did not enter into any legally enforceable agreement, prior to, or after,
the entry of the ORDER on January 19, 2005.

3.

Each party is fully entitled to pursue their legal rights and remedies with regard to
above-entitled .action and the real property located at 1131 Electra Lane.

DATED this /J_

day of j)ftst*U^

2005

BY THE COURT

JUDGE

2

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing O R D E R
ON HEARING OF DECEMBER 19, 2005 was, this 2 w

day of J^c^^l^

mail delivered to:

E. Craig Smay
Attorney at Law
174 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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considered the arguments of counsel for the parties. The Court, now for good cause appearing,
hereby finds the following facts and enters the following conclusions of law:
1.

Plaintiff SHARLENE FRANCISCONI filed the above-entitled eviction action
seeking to evict Defendant BECKY HALL from the home located at 1131 Electra
Lane, m Sandy, Utah.

1.

Defendant BECKY HALL was served a three-day Summons and Complaint for
Eviction, and Defendant filed an answer. Through Plaintiffs attorney, Mr. Jax
Pettey, Plaintiff moved the Court to set a possession bond. The Court set the bond
amount at $2,700 and Plaintiff posted the bond. Defendant BECKY HALL was
served with a Notice to Occupant(s) of Setting and Payment of Bond.

3.

Li reaction to the Notice, Defendant BECKY HALL, by and through her attorney,
filed DEFENDANT'S DEMAND FOR A HEARING AND NOTICE OF
SETTING. As required by Utah Code Section 78-36-8^5, the Court set a hearing
to determine the amount of the counter bond to be paid by Defendant, and that
hearing was scheduled for December 22, 2004, at 1:30 p.m.

4.

Prior to the hearing, Jax Pettey called Craig Smay. The parties attorneys had a
brief conversation at about 11:00 a.m. on the day of the hearing, where Mr. Pettey
said that his client wanted to work something out. Then, Mr. Pettey and Mr.
Smay had a brief meeting in the hall just before the hearing on December 22,
2004.

5.

Mr. Pettey again told Mr. Smay that SHARLENE FRANCISCONI wanted to
2

work something out. During the settlement discussions, Mr. Pettey acknowledged
that BECKY HALL had provided 530,000.00 toward the purchase price for the
real property located at 1131 Electra Lane. Mr. Smay asserted that Ms. HALL had
made improvements to the property and had made all but two payments on the
mortgage. Mr. Pettey informed Mr. Smay that Ms. FRANCISCONI claimed to
have made all the payments on the 1131 Electra Lane home since late April, 2004.
Also, Mr. Smay informed Mr. Pettey that Defendant HALL was also claiming that
improvements had been made to the 1131 Electra Lane home. As a result, the
parties had a dispute regarding the money paid by Ms. HALL to purchase and
maintain the 1131 Electra Lane home.
6.

Mr. Pettey told Mr. Smay that Ms. FRANCIS CONI was interested in obtaining an
appraisal of the 1131 Electra Lane home. .Both, Mr. Pettey and Mr. Smay
acknowledged that understanding the value of the home was going to be important
in order to go forward with further discussions.

7.

The parties discussed and agreed that each party should provide the other party
with information regarding the payments made by either party toward the
purchase and maintenance of the 1131 Electra Lane Home. The parties discussed
and agreed that Ms. FRANCISCONI could obtain an appraisal of the 1131 Electra
Lane home, and that Ms. HALL would cooperate so that Ms. FRANCISCONI
could obtain the appraisal. Further, the parties agreed that each party would
provide the other party with any appraisal the other party had obtained.
3

The parties agreed to meet, after the exchange of the payment information and the
appraisals, and at such meeting the parties would attempt to agree on an amount to
be paid by Ms. FRANCISCONI to Ms. HALL to settle the above-entitled
litigation, and to settle Ms. HALL's claims to the real property located at 1131
Electra Lane.
In the mean time, Ms. FRANCISCONI agreed to not pursue her remedies in the
above-entitled eviction proceeding, including not to pursue the immediate
removal of Ms. HALL from the real property located at 1131 Electra Lane, in
order for the parties to have the time to obtain appraisals, exchange payment
information, and pursue settlement negotiations.
On December 23, 2004, Mr. Pettey sent a fax to Mr. Smay addressing the areas
discussed on December 22. First, concerning the appraisal, the fax stated: "Mrs.
Francisconi has arranged for an appraiser to inspect the premises. We need to
arrange a time convenient with your client when lie can do so." Second,
concerning the copies of payments, the fax stated: tcI am in the process of
obtaining copies of payments (cancelled checks, telephonic transfers, wires, etc,)
made by my client on the mortgage and also a list of payments received by Escrow
Specialists." Third, with regard to further settlement negotiations, the fax stated:
"As soon as I have those in my possession", referring to the copies of payments, "I
would like to schedule a meeting with you to go over the accounting on the
payments, assuming you will have copies of cancelled checks, otc. from your
4

client as well." Finally, concerning the parties intentions resulting from the
December 22 conversations, the fax stated: "As I previously stated, it is our
intention to arrive at an agreeable figure, . . ."
11.

Sometime just prior to the January 14, 2005, Mr. Pettey received a document from
Mr. Smay entitled ORDER The ORDER had a post it note on it which stated,
"Please forward to the Court after signing & please fax us a copy of signature
page." The ORDER consisted of two pages, and did not have a Certificate of
Mailing attached. The ORDER proposed certain language and terms which were
additional to, and even inconsistent with, the terms stated in the December 23,
2004 fax. The ORDER proposed certain terms which were not even discussed by
the parties on December 22, 2004.

12.

Mr. Pettey believed that the ORDER was a proposed stipulation which was
different than the parties previous discussions. Mr. Petty did not believe that Mr.
Smay would submit the ORDER to the Court for signing. The Court finds Mr.
Pettey's belief reasonable, given that the ORDER delivered to Mr. Pettey did not
have a certificate of mailing and had a post it note indicating that it was Mr.
Pettey's responsibility to sign the ORDER and submit the same.

13.

Mr. Pettey sent a fax to Mr Smay on January 14, 2005, that disputed some of the
terms stated in the ORDER, and requested that Mr. Smay change the ORDER.

14.

The ORDER was submitted to the Court, with a certificate of mailing attached,
and was entered by the Court.
5

15.

The Court finds-that the ORDER was entered without the appropriate notice to
Plaintiff, and thus, the ORDER should be vacated.

16.

Subsequently, Ivlr. Pettey obtamed an appraisal of the 1131 Elecira Lane property,
obtamed copies of payments (cancelled checks, telephonic transfers, wires, etc.)
made by my client on the mortgage, obtamed a list of payments received by
Escrow Specialists, and was ready to schedule a meeting with Mr. Smay to go
over the accounting on the payments. AJso, Mr. Pettey was also ready to meet
with Mr. Smay to attempt to negotiate a resolution of the above-entitled matter.

17.

Plaintiff sent a settlement offer to Defendant on or about Apnl 5, 2005.

18.

However, Defendant was not pleased with Plaintiffs offer of settlement, and
decided to break off further settlement negotiations with Plaintiff Thus,
Defendant indicated that Defendant was rejecting Plaintiffs offer of settlement,
and Defendant did not provide any counter offer of settlement.

19.

Sometime after the receipt and review of the April 5th settlement offer from .
Plaintiff, Defendant became uninterested in meeting with Plaintiff, exchanging
payment information and appraisal information, and making any further efforts at
settlement. Thus, Defendant did not ever provide Plaintiff with proof of the
payments made by Defendant and the improvements made by Defendant.

20.

The Court finds that the parties did not come tojany legally enforceable
agreement, with regard to settlement of the above-entitled a c t i o n . ^

21.

The Court finds that the parties did not come to any legally enforceable

j.
^

v
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agreement, with regard to the home located at 1131 Electra Lane.
22.

The Court finds that settlement negotiations have broken down in the aboveentitled case, and that each party should be entitled to pursue their legaJ remedies.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The ORDER entered by the Court on January 19, 2005, was improvidently
entered and the ORDER should be vacated and set aside.

2.

The parties did not enter into any legally enforceable agreement, pnor to, or after,
the entry of the ORDER on January 19, 2005.

3.

Each party is fully entitled to pursue their legal rights and remedies with regard to
above-entitled action and the real property located at 1131 Electra Lane.

DATED this //_

day oi ^jjM^^y-

2005

BY THE COURT

JUBGE
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was, this *2
ttt-X^/lxf

, 2005, was mail delivered to:

E. Craig Smay
Attorney at Law
174 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

SHARLENE FRANCISCONI,
Plaintiff,

:

vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

BECKY HALL and/or JOHN DOES 1-2,
JANE DOES 1-2,
Defendants. •

:

Case-No. 040922431
Judge Denise Posse Lindberg

Tfl
This case was filed by Plaintiff on October 22, 2004 as an eviction action. In her
Complaint Plamtiff alleged that she is the owner of certain real propeity wliich has been occupied
by Defendant Hall, and that since October 14, 2004 the Defendant has been hi unlawful detainer
of the premises after defaulting on a Real Estate Contract between Plamtiff as Seller and
Defendant as Buyer and failing to cure following notice of default ] As authorized by the parties'
agreement, when Defendant did not cure the default after receiving notice thereof, Plamtiff
declared Defendant a tenant at-will and gave her a five-day notice to vacate the premises. 2

3

The. Plaintiff and Defendant are sisters and apparently had entered into an arrangement
whereby the property, worth approximately $122,500.00, would be purchased by Plaintiff, but
the down payment of $30,000.00 would be supplied by Defendant. The mortgage is in Plaintiffs
name, and the Plamtiff is obligated to repay the $91,500.00 mortgage pursuant to an Adjustable
Rate Note executed by Plaintiff in favor of Ameriquest Mortgage Company. The parties then
entered into a Real Estate Contract the financial terms of which were identical to the payments,
interest, and other charges anticipated under the terms of the Note signed by Plaintiff.
Defendant's payments under the Real Estate Contract were timed to be received in time for
Plaintiff to apply those payments to her obligations under the Note.
2

The Real Estate Contract provided that in the event of Buyer's default, Seller would giv&
Buyer written notice of such default, and Buyer would have twenty days from receipt of written
notice within which to cure the default. If necessary, a second written notice of failure to cure
would then be provided, and Seller would have several options available to her. hi this case,
Seller opted to exercise the option by which
[ijmmediately upon Buyer's receipt of [the] second written notice, Seller shall be
released from all obligations at law and equity to convey the Property to Buyer,
^^mmmammmmmmm^

I

EXHIBIT

I

Defendant, through counsel, filed her answer on October 28, 2004. Since that time, multiple
hearings have been held and rulings entered by various judges to whom this case has been
assigned during m the intervening period. The principal issue m dispute has been whether an
Order originally entered by Judge Hennod in January 19, 2005, stt aside by Order signed by
Judge Dever on May 25, 2005 following a hearing on May 9, 2005, and then, after further
heanngs, again set aside by Judge Himonas as having been "improvidently entered," 3 warrants
certification for interlocutory appeal, as Defendant contends, or whether the matter should simply
be allowed to proceed to trial on the unlawful detainer issue, as Plaintiff argues.
TJ2
After entry of Judge Himonas' Order of January 11, 2006, the case was transferred to this
Court. On February 2, 2006 Defendant filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim, but failed
to first seek leave of Court to do so, and also failed to pay the required filing fee.4 When Plaintiff
did not respond, Defendant sought entry of a Default Judgment. This Court declined to enter
Plaintiffs default, holding that Defendant's new pleadings were not properly before the Court.
Tf3
At Plaintiffs request the Court held a bond hearing on March. 30, 2006. In that hearing
the Court ordered that if Defendant wished to remain hi possession of the premises during the

and Buyer shall become at once a tenant-at-will of Seller. All payments which
have been made by Buyer prior thereto under this contract shall, subject to then
existing law and equity, be retained by Seller as liquidated and agreed damages
for breach of this contract.
Real Estate Contract, Section 14(A).
3

On May 9, 2005 Judge Dever, who was then assigned the case, held a hearing on
Plaintiffs motion to SQt aside the Januaiy 19,2005 Order. As recited in Judge Dever's May 25,
2005 Order, "the Order entered from the December 22, 2004 hearing, which was entered Januaiy
19, 2005 is hereby set aside." The Court expressly found that the January 19th Order, as
"prepared by counsel for Defendant and entered by the Court does not reflect the parties
agreement as stated on the transcript." Thereafter Judge Dever agreed to stay his Order of May
25th to allow the parties to present further argument. On June 3 rd , after considering the parties'
arguments Judge Dever announced that he would still set aside the Januaiy 19th Order.
Defendant continued to object to the Court's action and based on the Court's statements, then
moved to disqualify Judge Dever. Judge Dever granted Defendant's motion and the case was
reassigned to Judge Himonas. hi view of the parties' continued dispute regarding the January 19,
2005 Order, Judge Himonas conducted another evidentiary hearing, and entered Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law on Januaiy 11, 2006. Judge Himonas, like Judge Dever before him,
concluded that the Order of Januaiy 19, 2005 should be vacated and set aside. He also held that
the parties had "not enterfed] nito any legally enforceable agreement prior to, or after, entry of
the Order on January 19, 2005."
4

In addition to the problems already noted, Defendant's purported Amended Answer and
Counterclaim referenced certain exhibits which she did not file with the Court.
-2-

pendency of the action she would have to post a 521,000.00 bond. Defendant never posted the
bond; instead, she sought an emergency petition/writ for extraordinary relief from the appellate
court. That petition was denied by the Supreme Court on May 17, 2006. Short]}' thereafter
Defendant sought a Rule 54(b) certification from this Court, which was denied.5
TJ4
Finally, on June 13, 2006, Defendant filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer
and Counterclaim, and Memorandum in support of that motion. The Memorandum is completely
devoid of any legal analysis m support of the motion; Defendant's sole argument is that "the
proposed amendment [to the pleadings] appears to have been anticipated and intended by the
recent order setting aside a prior settlement in this matter, insofar as it purports to replace [sic]
the parties at the outset of the litigation." The Defendant then asserts that "refusal of leave
would by [sic] manifestly unjust in the circumstances" and recites that discovery has not
commenced and there are no unresolved issues outstanding.
Tf5 ' On June 29, 2006 Plaintiff filed her Opposition to Defendant's motion. Defendant has
not filed a Reply and the time for response has run. A Notice to Submit was filed July 7, 2006.
^6
On June 23, 2006, at Defendant's request the Court held a hearing to determine whether
an Order of Restitution signed by the Court on May 31, 2006 should not have ben entered.6

5

Although the Court recalls preparing a Minute Entry in response to Defendant's efforts
to seek a petition for extraordinary relief, the Court record appears to be missing that Minute
Entry. The Court cannot recall specifically all that was covered in that Minute Entry, but it is
clear from what is hi the record (specifically the Defendant's "Reply to Response of Honorable
Denise Lindberg to Petition for Extraordinary Relief/Petition for Emergency Relief 5 ), that at
some point the Court referenced a Rule 54(b) interlocutory appeal as a more appropriate avenue
for relief. Defendant has made much of the fact that the Court apparently was the one that
initiall}' raised that possibility. Even if that is the case, however, prior to such an "option" being
available to her, the requirements of Rule 54(b) must be satisfied. That is, multiple claims would
that there was no just reason for delay in entering judgment on one claim. As a necessary pre
have had to be properly before the Court, and the Court would have had to make an express
determination requisite, Defendant needed to bring a proper motion for leave to file an Amended
Answer and, if the motion was granted, she would then have to pay the appropriate fees. While
Defendant had filed an Amended Answer including a counterclaim, she had not obtained the
necessary advance approval from the Court, nor had she paid the necessary fees prior to filing her
May 25, 2006 motion for interlocutory appeal. Because those necessary prerequisites had not
been satisfied, the Court denied Defendant's Rule 54(b) motion by Minute Entry dated June 1,
2006.
6

As a result of the Order of Restitution Defendant was evicted from the premises on or
about June 14, 2006. By letter to the Court Defendant's counsel objected that he had not
received adequate notice that the Order of Restitution would be submitted to the Court. After
receiving Defendant's objection the Court reviewed the entire file and noted that there probably
-3-

During that hearing Defendant's counsel again raised the issue of an interlocutor)' appeal of
Judge Himonas5 Order setting aside the January 19, 2005 Order, hi response, the Court noted
that Defendant had finally filed a motion for leave to amend and had paid the required fees.
Without having carefully reviewed Defendant's motion and proposed Amended Answer and
Counterclaim, the Court "reaffirmed" that it would sign a Rule 54(b) certification once it was
submitted, hi making this commitment the Court assumed that the motion for leave to amend
would be meritorious and would therefore be granted. Defendant promptly filed a proposed
Order Certifying Appeal.
%1
On June 29, 2006, Plaintiff timely filed her Opposition to the Motion for Leave to File
Amended Answer and Counterclaim, and Plaintiffs Objection to the form of the Order
Certifying Appeal. Defendant did not reply to either of Plaintiff s filings.
^[8
The Court is keenly aware that leave to amend "should be freely given when justice so
requires." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). The Court is also mindful that on June 23, 2006 the Court
reaffirmed its willingness to certify the matter under Rule 54(b). Nevertheless, a prerequisite to
granting leave to file is that Defendant carry her burden of showing that leave should be granted
under the standards developed under the case law. To be sure, Rule 15 is to be liberally
construed to permit timely and proper amendments. Still, Utah case law has elaborated on the
rule's requirements and concluded that, at a minimum, the following three factors should be
considered: (a) the timeliness of the motion: (b) the justification given by the movant for the
delay; and (c) the resulting-prejudice to the responding party. See Regional Sales Agency. Inc. V.
Reichert 784 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Utah Ct App. 1989). As noted by the appellate court in Kellv v.
Hard Money Funding. Inc., 2004 UT App. 44 fl26, 87 P.3d 734, this-three-pronged test is "the
predicate for analysis of motions to amend.55

had been an irregularity in how the Order of Restitution was handled. It appears that the Order of.
Restitution previously, sought by Plaintiff on April 24, 2006 and denied by the Court because the
case was on an emergency appeal, was returned to Plaintiffs counsel instead of being filed
unsigned as part of the record. Thereafter, when the Court denied an earlier Rule 54(b)
certification request filed by Defendant, Plaintiffs counsel resubmitted the same Order of
Restitution for the Court's signature without providing new notice to Defendant's counsel, hi the
Court's view this was a procedural irregularity that should not have occurred. However, prior to
signing the're-submitted Order of Restitution, the Court verified that Defendant had never posted
the counter-bond required to remain in possession of the premises. At the June 23, 2006 hearing
the Court concluded that the failure of notice to defense counsel was hannless error because the
Order of Restitution would still have been signed by the Court even if proper notice had been
given. Defendant had been on notice that she needed to post the bond amount set by the Court if
she wished to remain in the premises during pendency of the case. By failing to post the bond
Defendant subjected herself to the probability of eviction prior to the resolution of the parties'
competing claims. Accordingly, the Court re-affirmed the issuance of the Order of Restitution.

-4-

^j9
With respect to the timeliness prong, the court in Hard Money Funding noted that
"motions to amend are typically deemed untimely when they are filed in the advanced procedural
stages of the litigation process, such as after the completion of discovery, on the eve of a
scheduled trial date, or after an order of dismissal has already been entered." Id. TJ29. hi this case
Defendant recites that "no discovery has commenced," although she has not identified what
specific discovery needs to take place. Although Plaintiff does not expressly dispute Defendant's
representation, on June 29, 2006 Plaintiff filed a Request for Final Pre-Tnal Conference and
Request for Trial setting. That suggests to the Court that Plaintiff does not believe additional
discovery is needed.
1J10
"[Rjegardless of the procedural posture of the case, motions to amend have typically been
deemed untimely when they were filed several years into the litigation. Id^ at ^J30. Here,
Defendant, with assistance of counsel, filed her Answer on October 28, 2004. She made no
effort to amend her pleading until a year and five months after the case had begun (a year and
nine months if one includes the elapsed time until Defendant actually filed a motion for leave to
amend). She makes no effort to address the reasons for her delay, even .though the causes of
action raised m her Counterclaim have been known to her from the outset of this litigation.
Tfl 1 Under the justification prong of the analysis, the Court must examine "whether the
moving party had knowledge of the events that are sought to be added in the amended [pleading]
before the original [pleading] was filed.55 Hard Money Funding, at ^[32. With respect to this
prong the Hard Money court concluded that m maldng this analysis the Court should focus on the
reasons offered by the moving party (here, Defendant) for not including the facts or allegations in
her original Answer. See Id. At ^[3 8. Thus, "hi cases where the party7 knew of the events or
claims earlier yet failed to plead them due to a dilatory motive, a bad faith effort during the
pleading process, or unreasonable neglect in terms of pleading preparation, it would follow that
the motion to amend could be denied on that basis." Id. hi this case there is no allegation that
Defendant was unaware of her claims at the time she filed her Answer, and she has given
_absolutely no explanation for her delay in bringing these claims. This is not a case where
Defendant initially filed a pro se answer and thereafter counsel entered an appearance. From the
beginning of this case Defendant has been represented by the same counsel. There is absolutely
iio reason why the claims which Defendant now seeks to raise could not have been properly
raised two years ago at the time of her original Answer. The Court is satisfied that, at a
minimum, Defendant's failure to act m a more timely maimer constitutes "unreasonable neglect
in terms of pleading preparation."
TJ12 Finally, under the prejudice-prong of the analysis, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated
that "a showing of simple prejudice is not enough to support a denial of a motion to amend."
Kasco S&rvs. Corp. V. Benson, S31 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah 1992). Rather, the prejudice "must be
undue or substantial prejudice, since almost every amendment of a pleading will result in some
'practical prejudice/ to the opposing party. Mere inconvenience to the opposing party is not
grounds to deny a motion to amend." Hard Money Funding;, at ^[31. Thus, such motions should
be denied only where "the opposing side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an

-5-

issue adjudicated for which [she] had no time to prepare.'5 JcL (citation omitted). Here, there is
no allegation by Plaintiff that the Amended .Answer and Counterclaim would present her with an
issue for which she has had no time to prepare. Thai said, Plaintiff has filed an affidavit stating
that the Defendant has not made any payment to maintain the mortgage, pay rent, or pay any
money toward the maintenance of the property since April 2004. Defendant has not contested
these factua] assertions. Even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff is not prejudiced in her ability to
respond to Defendant's new claims, there are other considerations that in the Court's view
amount to "undue or substantial prejudice" to Plaintiff. As noted above, the Defendant does not
dispute Plaintiffs factual assertions. Defendant effectively concedes that she occupied the
premises from April 2004 to June 14, 2006 without making a single payment towards the
financial obligations associated with the premises, hi the meantime, Plaintiff has had to cany all
those costs in order not to lose her own interest in the property. Further delays in bringing this
case to trial will only delay Plaintiff s ability to take other remedial action, such as securing a
new tenant, to ease the financial burden that has likely resulted from this dispute.
f 13
In addition to the above referenced factors, the appellate, courts have urged trial courts
also to consider other relevant factors arising in the context of a particular case. Here, the
principal cause of the delays in moving this case forward stem from Defendant's repeated
insistence that the judges who have considered the matter have erred hi then" determination that
the Order of January 19, 2005 should be set aside. Heanng after heanng has been devoted to that
issue, with Defendant being unwilling to accept the Court's judgment on the matter. Further
delays have been occasioned by Defendant's disagreement with the Court's order regarding the
possession bond requirement if she wished to remain-at the premises during pendency of the
action. Finally, the Court notes that there is a substantial likelihood that even if leave to amend
were granted, at least two, and possibly all three of Defendant's claims might not survive a
motion to dismiss under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Specifically, the Court agrees with Plaintiff
that Defendant has failed to plead with specificity the fraud claim, as required by Utah R. Civ. P.
9. Additionally, the Court believes Defendant's abuse of process claim also would not survive a
motion to dismiss.7 While it is a closer call whether or not the "anticipatory breach of contract"

7

Plaintiff bases her argument regarding the abuse of process claim on the fact that "the
proceedings have not terminated in favor of the Defendant, and thus the Defendant Becky Hall's
allegations of abuse of process are premature." Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Amended
Answer and Counterclaim, 2, at page 4, citing Arnica Mutual Lis. Co v. Schettler.768 P.2d 950,
959 (Utah Ct App. 1989). As recently noted by the Utah Supreme Court, "[cjonfusion
surrounding the term "abuse of process" is not uncommon inasmuch as it is often 'employed . . .
as a catch-all description of any private misuse of judicial resources.'" Anderson Dev. Co. LC v.
Tobias, 2005 UT 36 1)63, ] 16 P.3d 323. The Supreme Court declared that "abuse of process
'applies to one who uses a ]ega] process . . . against another primarily to accomplish a purpose
for which it is not designed. "TcL "[T]o establish a claim for abuse of process, a claimant must
demonstrate 'first, an ulterior puipose; and second, an act in the use of the process not proper in
the regular prosecution of the proceedings/" IdL at ^J65. "Unlike a [party] asserting a claim for
wrongful civil proceedings, a plaintiff in an abuse of process claim is not required to establish
-6-

claim would survive such a motion, the Court is not convinced that this is enough to tip the
balance towards allowing amendment of the pleadings when considering the totality of the
circumstances and the foregoing analysis.
ORDER
^[14
The Court concludes that Defendant's motion for leave to amend the pleadings should be
DENIED, hi light of the Court's detemimation, Rule 54(b) certification is still not appropriate
since only Plaintiffs eviction claim is at issue in the case. The matter will be set for trial. No
further Order is required to effectuate the Court's decision herein.
Entered by the Court this 11th day of Jul}'

that the prior proceeding terminated hi his favor . . . " Id, In this case it is not clear whether
Defendant is actually asserting a claim for "abuse of process" or for "wrongful civil
proceedings." Defendant's only allegation is that "[t]he present [eviction] action was filed
maliciously and for an improper purpose. In pursuit of such puipose [Plaintiff] has served
process upon [Defendant] to force vacation of the premises." hi any event, under the elements
for either action as articulated by the Supreme Court in Tobias, Defendant has failed to state a
claim.
-7-
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

SHARLENE FRANCISCONI,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
JUDGMENT and ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
BECKY HALL, and individual, and/or
JOHN DOES 1-2, JANE DOES 1-2,
Defendants.

Case No. 0409 22431 EV
Judge Denise Posse Lindberg

A trial was held on this matter on January 3 rd, 2007. Plaintiff was represented by her
attorney, Gregory M. Constantino. Defendant was represented by her attorney, Craig Smay. The
parties presented evidence at trial. The Court heard the testimony of Sharlene Francisconi, Becky
Hall, Kim Aiken and Steve Brantley. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibits and Defendant's Trial Exhibits were
admitted into evidence. The Court, being fully informed, now enters the following Findings of Fact:

~ FINDINGS OF FACT1.

Plaintiff Sharlene Francisconi ("Francisconi") and Defendant Becky Hall ("Hall") are

sisters. Sometime in late 2001 or early 2002, the parties decided that they would cooperate to obtain

a home for Hall.1 The basics of the agreement were that Hall, who was not particularly credit-worthy
because of multiple prior bankruptcies and vehicle repossessions, would provide a down payment
of $30,000.00.2 Francisconi would use her creditworthiness to finance the balance of the purchase
price, but Hall would make the monthly payments due on the mortgage loan secured by Francisconi.
The payments would be made through an escrow company to help re-establish Hall's credit.
2.

Pursuant to the parties' agreement, on or about February 8, 2002, Francisconi

purchased a home located at 1131 E. Electra Lane, in Sandy, Utah, for a price of $121,500. After
crediting the $30,000.00 down payment provided by Hall, the balance of the purchase price was
financed through an Adjustable Rate Note (the "Note") on which Francisconi alone was obligated..
(Plaintiff s Exhibit 1)
3.

On March 1,2002, Francisconi and Hall memorialized their understanding in a Real

Estate Contract (the "Contract") signed by the parties at the offices of 1st National Title Company
(the "title company"). (Plaintiffs Exhibit 2). In addition to the Contract, the parties signed a Quit
Claim Deed, Trust Deed, Special Warranty Deed, and Escrow Agreements that same day at the
offices of the title company. Steve Brantley, an escrow officer for the title company, met with the
parties, explained the documents that each of the parties were signing, and notarized the signed
documents.

b a l l ' s uncontradicted testimony is that she had preferred to purchase a home on the
"west side" of Salt Lake valley. However, Francisconi was apparently only willing to consider
lending her credit for the purchase of a home on the "east side" of the valley. The parties
ultimately agreed on the home at 1131 Electra Lane in Sandy, Utah. Notwithstanding Hall's
expressed preferences, the Court finds that she was part of the decisionmaking process that
ultimately settled on the purchase of the Electra Lane property.
2

Sometime in January or February, 2002, Hall closed on the sale of some real
property in the area of Evanston, Wyoming. Hall received approximately $65,000.00 from that
sale. The $30,000.00 down payment on the Electra Lane property came from the proceeds of the
Wyoming land sale.
2

4.

Paragraph 4 of the Contract states:
"Price and Payment.
A. Buyer [Hall] agrees to pay for the Property the purchase price of
NinetyOne Thousand Five Hundred Dollars and 00/100 ($91,500.00),
payable to Sharlene Francisconi, or to her order on the following terms:
The terms of the principal and interest portion of the payments mirror
the terms of that certain Adjustable Rate Note, dated February 8,
2002, executed by Francisconi in favor od [sic] Ameriquest Mortgage
Company, in the principle [sic] amount of $91,500.00, and with an
initial interest rate of 8.65%. The amount of principal and interest
owing under this Contract are identical to the amounts owing for each
payment under the terms of the Note. Further, any changes in the
interest rate, prepayment charges, or other obligations owing to
Ameriquest Mortgage are incorporated herein by reference.
However, the payment is due on the first day of each month, and late
after the FIFTH day of each month, with a 6.0% late fee owing after
the fifth day of each month (rather than the fifteenth day as set forth
in the Note).'5

5.

The Ameriquest Mortgage, referred to in paragraph 4 of the Contract, is the Note

offered into evidence as Plaintiffs Exhibit 1.
6.

Paragraph 22 of the Contract contains an integration clause that specifically names

certain contemporaneously executed documents that together form the parties' complete agreement:
(a) the Contract (Plaintiffs Exhibit 2), (b) the Escrow Agreement for Funds Held (Plaintiffs Exhibit
3), (c) the Supplemental Escrow Instructions, (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4), (d) the Quit-Claim Deed,
(Plaintiff s Exhibit 6).3
7.

Included among the documents forming the integrated Contract are two Escrow

Agreements by which Hall agreed to deposit $5,000.00 for the benefit of Francisconi in the event
Hall failed to make monthly payments each month to cover the mortgage obligation. The escrowed

Although referenced in the Contract, at trial neither party produced the Trust Deed or the
Special Warranty Deed.
3

funds would be "available for demand to be paid to any amounts due and owing with respect to the
property." Plaintiffs Ex. 3 ("Escrow Agreement"); Plaintiffs Ex. 4 ("Supplemental Escrow
Instructions").
8.

The express terms of the Escrow Agreement provide that Francisconi had the

discretion (but not the obligation) to demand that payments be made from the escrowed amount upon
notification that Hall had not made her payments as scheduled by the 5th of the month. See
Paragraph 4 ("Sharlene may then demand, in writing, that an amount of the escrowed funds . . . be
released"); see also Paragraph 6 ("If Francisconi requests or demands advances to pay any sums
owing for payments . . . .")(emphasis added).
9.

Hall initially made her payments under the Contract on a regular basis. However, at

various times between June 2002 and June 2004 Hall failed to make a number of payments under
the Contract. Specifically, Ex. 8 at page 2 itemizes payments which Hall failed to make. At trial,
Hall did not dispute these specific claims by Francisconi. Therefore, the Court accepts these claims
as having been established by the evidence.
10.

Consistent with the parties' intent as reflected in the Contract and accompanying

Escrow Agreement, the missed payments were made up by drawing from the escrowed $5,000.00.
Based on the testimony and exhibits introduced at trial, the Court finds that the money in escrow
was depleted by June 2004.
11.

Because of the adjustable nature of the Note, by late 2003, the monthly payment under

the Note had increased to $940.67. Hall testified that at various times she tried to get certain friends
qualified to purchase the home, or to arrange for her own financing. The parties disagree on why
those efforts were unsuccessful. Hall asserts it is because Francisconi would not cooperate. Hall,
however, presented no evidence establishing that Hall's financial circumstances in fact would have
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qualified her to refinance the home on her own.4 Although there was some conflicting evidence at
trial, the Court credits Francisconi's testimony that Hall, who was facing health problems, wanted
to lower her monthly payment on the house. The parties differ on whether or not Francisconi
informed Hall of the timing of Francisconi's refinancing efforts, but the Court finds that dispute not
material to the decision herein. The fact is that Francisconi was able to refinance the home and
thereby accomplish Half s stated goal, which was to lower her monthly payment on the house. The
refinance was completed in December, 2003 and lowered the monthly payment for which Hall was
responsible to $716.50 per month.
12.

In connection with, or shortly after, the refinance, Francisconi also secured a line of

credit using the equity interest in the Electra home. As a result, a second mortgage lien was placed
on the property. The parties dispute whether or not Francisconi disclosed this second lien on the
property to Hall. Francisconi used the money from the line of credit to make other real estate
investments in February 2004. Hall was never responsible for any payments on the line of credit;
those payments were solely Francisconi's responsibility. Francisconi retired that debt in M l
sometime in the Fall, 2004.
13.

Hall made two payments-in February and March 2004-at the lower monthly rate.

4

Hall presented the testimony of Kim Aiken, a real estate agent and mortgage broker who
insisted that Hall had a "good enough" FICO score that she (Hall) "would have qualified [for
financing] as of February or March 2004." Ms. Aiken testified that the problems were
attributable to Francisconi, who blocked Aiken's efforts either to sell the house or to secure other
financing for Hall. After considering the totality of the testimony the Court declines to credit Ms.
Aiken's testimony. Absolutely no evidence was ever presented that Hall had the financial
wherewithal to secure independent financing, nor was she ever able to get any surrogate to
qualify for financing. In fact, according to Hall's own testimony, because of her health problems
at the time, between December 2003 and March 2004 she was on medical disability and was only
receiving 2/3rds of her salary. It is not clear whether she ever returned to work after March 2004.
As noted supra, even when she was able to work her maximum regular earnings were only
$12.00 per hour, and she only worked a maximum of 32 hour per week That, by itself, would
likely make the availability of independent financing highly improbable.
5

Thereafter, Hall stopped making payments altogether. She never made or tendered another payment
owing under the Contract.
14.

Based on the Court's review of the exhibits submitted at trial, the Court finds that as

of June 28, 2004, at least the following payments were past due:
A. June 2002 payment of $858.025
B. March 11, 2003 "garbage assessment" fee of $165.296
C. November, 2003 payment of $940.67
C. April, 2004 payment of $719.15
. D. May, 2004 payment of $718.88
E. June, 2004 payment of $748.06
15.

Paragraph 14 of the Contract provides as follows:
Buyer's Default. Should buyer fail to comply with any of the terms hereof,
Seller may, in addition to any other remedies afforded the Seller in this
contract or by law, elect any of the following remedies:
A.

Seller shall give Buyer written notice specifically stating: (1) The
Buyer's default(s); (2) that buyer shall have twenty (20) days from her
receipt of such written notice within which to cure the default(s),
which cure shall include payments of Seller's costs and reasonable
attorney's fees; and (3) Seller's intent to elect this remedy if the
Buyer does not cure the default(s) within the twenty %(20) days.

5

Early on in their agreement, the parties apparently agreed that Hall would be allowed to
access the escrow account to make her June 2002 payment. At trial, Hall argued that because
this was agreed upon by the parties, it did not constitute a default under the terms of their
Contract. However, the Escrow Agreement specifically provides that funds could be released to
meet obligations under the Note, or "for any other obligations owed with respect to the property,"
but that accessing those funds would "NOT remedy or cure the default." Plaintiffs Ex.3.
6

Under paragraph 8 of the Contract, Hall was obligated to pay "all taxes and assessments
of every kind during the life of [the] Contract." Francisconi testified that Hall failed to pay a
"garbage assessment" fee in the amount of $165.29. Hall did not dispute Francisconi's testimony
on this issue, and therefore the Court accepts it.
6

Should Buyer fail to cure such default(s) within the thirty (20) days,
then Seller shall give to Buyer another written notice informing Buyer
of his failure to cure the default(s) and of Seller's election of this
remedy. Immediately upon Buyer's receipt of this second written
notice, Seller shall be released from all obligations at law and equity
to convey the Property to Buyer, and Buyer shall become at once a
tenant-at-will of Seller. All payments which have been made by
Buyer prior thereto under this contract shall, subject to then existing
law and equity, be retained by Seller as liquidated and agreed
damages for breach of this contract.
16.

On June 30, 2004, Hall was personally served a Notice which stated:
Pursuant to paragraph 14a of the contract, you are hereby given the
required 20-day notice to bring all sums current. In order to bring the
terms of the contract into compliance, it is necessary for you to pay
the sum of $4,972.22, plus the amount necessary to serve this notice
upon you, on or before the 20th day following service of this Notice
upon you.

17.

The Notice further stated:
In the event that you do not pay the necessary amount on or before the
20th day following the date of service of this document upon you, then
your interest in and to the property referenced above will be forfeited
and you will be considered a tenant at will and you will be subject to
eviction.

18.

Hall did not tender or attempt to tender any payment to Francisconi after redeiving

the Notice.
19.

On August 9, 2004, Defendant Hall was personally served with a Notice

which stated:
Please be advised that more than twenty days have elapsed since demand was
made upon you to bring current all sums owing to Sharlene Francisconi. That
demand has not been satisfied, and pursuant to the terms of paragraph 14 of
the contract, you are hereby notified that any interest you may have had in the
property is now forfeited.
7

You are considered a tenant at will, and pursuant to the terms of Utah law,
this demand is for you to remove yourself and your possessions within FIVE
(5) days of service of this Notice and Demand upon you.
If you have not removed yourself and your possession within FIVE (5) days
of service of this Notice upon you, an action to have you evicted may be
commenced, and you may be found liable for any and all legal fees necessary
to enforce the terms of the contract, as well as TREBLE damages for any
period of holdover tenancy. In addition, a judgment may be taken against you
for such damages, and you non-exempt personal property may be seized and
sold and funds applied to any judgment granted.
20.

At trial, Hall argued that Francisconi's second mortgage line of credit obtained in

December 2003 breached the Contract and excused- her from making any payments due on the
Contract. Paragraph 9 of the Contract provides as follows:
Covenant against liens. Except for the liens and encumbrances set forth
above, Seller [Francisconi] covenants to keep the Property free and clear of
liens and encumbrances arising from acts of Seller. So long as Buyer [Hall]
is current hereunder, Seller agrees to keep current the payments on all
obligations to which Buyer's interest is subordinate. Should Seller default on
the foregoing covenants on any one or more occasions, Buyer may, at Buyer's
option, in whole or in part, make good Seller's default to Seller's obligee and
deduct all expenditures so paid from future payments to Seller and Seller
shall credit all buyer's sums so expended to the indebtedness herein created
just as if payment had been made directly to Seller under provisions of
Section 4 above.
21.

The Court accepts Francisconi's uncontradicted testimony that she had the present

ability at any point in 2004 to pay off the home equity line of credit. The Court finds that if Hall
been able to secure alternative financing to cover the first mortgage, Francisconi would have been
able to meet her obligation to deliver a Warranty Deed to Hall as required by paragraph 7(B) of
Contract, which provides as follows:
Refinancing/Pay-Out, In the event Buyer pays or obtains a new loan
refinancing the underlying obligation, the Buyer shall be entitled to the
8

delivery of a Warranty Deed executed by Seller wherein the Buyer is Grantee;
provided, however, if any portion of the Seller's equity remains unpaid, then
the following conditions precedent shall have been satisfied: (1) Buyer is not
then in default under any of the terms of this Contract; (2) the principal
amount of the new loan may exceed the balance of the underlying obligation
being refinanced only if all loan proceeds which exceed the unpaid balance
of the underlying obligation are paid to the Seller as a credit against the
unpaid balance of the Seller's Equity in this Contract; and (3) Buyer shall
have executed and delivered to Seller an executed Trust Deed Note in the
form, amount, and with the terms of the Trust Deed note described in
paragraph 7(A)(3) above. Such note shall be subordinate only to the Trust
Deed securing the new loan and any remaining Trust Deed securing the
underlying obligation which have not been reconveyed.
22.

However, the Court finds that at no point from March 2002 until her eviction in June

2006 did Hall ever have the financial ability to secure financing on her own for the Electra Lane
home. Neither was she ever able to put forward a surrogate who could qualify to assume the loan
on the Electra Lane home.
23.

Further, in late November, 2003, Hall was in default in the payment terms

of the Contract, and would have had to bring those payments current before being able to exercise
her right under the contract to refinance the property and secure a pay-off.
24.

After receiving the Notice on August 9, 2004, Defendant Hall did not

remove herself from the premises. Rather, Hall remained in possession of the 113%1 Electra Lane
home until June 14, 2006.7
25.

On October 22, 2004, the above-entitled action was filed. Hall

was served with a Three Day Summons and Complaint for Unlawful Detainer on October 26,2004.

7

In order to protect her own interests in the property, as well as her own creditworthiness,
Francisconi first applied the moneys in the escrow account towards the financial obligations of
the Note. Once those funds were exhausted, Francisconi continued making the payments on the
Note even though Hall made no further payments between April 2004 and the time when she was
evicted in June 2006.
9

After extended pre-trial proceedings Hall was eventually evicted on June 14, 2006 on the basis of
a Writ of Restitution signed by this Court.8
26.

Francisconi testified as to her belief of the fair rental value of the Electra Lane

property. According to Francisconi's testimony, she believed the rental value during 2002 was
$1,000.00 per month; that it climbed to $1,200.00 per month in 2005, and climbed again to
$ 1,400.00 per month in 2006. While Francisconi testified she had experience in real estate and rental
properties, she was not expressly qualified as an expert in that area, and the Court finds some of that
testimony to be contradicted by other facts in evidence. For example, both Francisconi and Hall
testified that when Hall moved out, the home "could not be rented out in its current state." Although
no testimony was specifically elicited regarding the nature of repairs that would need to be made
before the home was fit for re-rental or sale, it seems clear that Francisconi's estimate of a $ 1,400.00
per month fair rental value in 2006 may be inflated given the condition of this home, even if rents
in neighboring areas might have been higher.
27.

Based on the testimony and evidence presented at trial, the Court accepts

Francisconi's initial determination of the property's monthly fair rental value for 2002 as being
$1,000.00 per month. For the reasons stated below, the Court also finds that the $1,200 per month
estimate for 2005 is also fair and reasonable, and therefore adopts it. However, the Court rejects
Francisconi's further estimate that the fair rental value of the Electra Lane home was $1,400.00 in
2006. Instead, the Court continues the $1,200.00 per month amount as the fair rental value
throughout the rest of the term of Hall's occupancy. The Court arrives at this based on the evidence
presented at trial. Starting first with the fact that that the initial mortgage payments on the home

8

After being evicted from the home, Hall and a friend re-entered the home through a
window and without authorization. It is not clear exactly when that re-entry was discovered or
what final steps were taken to remove Hall from the residence.
10

were set at $858.02 per month, and during the course of Hall's occupancy ranged from a high of
$940.67 to a low of $716.50 per month. Additional testimony established that at different times
Hall had renters living with her at the home, and that from renters she received amounts ranging
from $300 to $900 per month. Averaging the documented monthly mortgage costs, and adding the
lowest amount paid by renters, the Court finds that the monthly rental value of $ 1,200 as estimated
by Francisconi is not excessive. Accordingly, the Court finds that this is an appropriate rental value
on which to compute statutory damages under the unlawful detainer statute. No evidence was
presented at trial in support of claims for additional damage.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court, being fully informed, now enters the below stated Conclusions of Law:
28.

The Court concludes that the Contract signed by the parties on March 1, 2002 was

a legal and binding agreement, and together with the documents referenced therein, constituted the
final expression of the parties' agreement concerning the real property located at 1131 E Electra
Lane. The Court expressly rejects Hall's characterization of the Contract as "fundamentally
unenforceable, as lacking consideration . . . " Defendant's Trial Memo, at 2. See also id. (arguing
that the Contract was "entirely without consideration given by [Francisconi], or was based upon a
consideration which was wholly illusory"). Hall's consideration for the Contract was the $30,000
down payment. Francisconi's consideration for the Contract was the use of her creditworthiness to
secure a mortgage-something Hall was unable to do on her own. In the process of securing a
mortgage for the property, Francisconi became legally bound to repay the Note in the amount of
$91,500.00. This is more than adequate consideration to support the Contract.
29.

The Court further rejects Defendant's characterization of the Contract as a "contract

of adhesion, or an outright fraud." Id. The Court has closely reviewed the terms of the Contract and
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adjunct agreements that together comprise the integrated agreement. To be sure, this land-sale
Contract principally protects Francisconi, not an unusual circumstance in a "sub-prime" situation
where the owner of the real estate is financing the sale of the property to a marginally qualified
buyer. However, that, by itself, does not make the Contract unconscionable or unenforceable.
Francisconi could reasonably have charged Hall some premium for the use of her credit and required
Hall's monthly payments to include some small percentage above the amount Francisconi was
obligated to pay under the Note. This she did not do. The terms of the Contract mirrored exactly
the terms of the Note. In short, had Hall timely performed her obligations under the Contract, she
would have acquired the property for exactly the amount that Francisconi committed to pay for it.
This is hardly an unconscionable agreement.
30.

The Court also rejects Hall's argument that by encumbering the property through a

second mortgage line of credit, Francisconi anticipatorily breached the Contract by failing to deliver
a Warranty Deed to Hall. Hall argues that Francisconi's alleged breach excused her performance
under the Contract.
31.

While the Court concludes that Francisconi's encumbrance of the Electra Lane home

with a second mortgage line of credit in December 2003 violated the provisions of Paragraph 9 of
the Contract, the Contract itself anticipated that possibility and provided the remedy in the event it
occurred. Specifically, Paragraph 9 of the Contract provides that
[sjhould Seller [Francisconi] default on the foregoing covenants
[referring to the covenant against liens] on any one or more
occasions, Buyer [Hall] may, at Buyer's option, in whole or in part,
make good Seller's default to Seller's obligee and deduct all
expenditures so paid from future payments to seller, and Seller shall
credit all Buyer's sums so expended to the indebtedness herein
created just as if payment had been made directly to Seller under
provisions of [the Contract].
32.

The Court concludes that Hall was not excused from making the monthly payments
12

due under the Contract because of the second mortgage/line of credit placed on the 1131 Electra
Lane home by Francisconi in December 2003. Hall never exercised the remedy the parties bargained
for in their Contract.
33.

Moreover, the Court concludes that Hall's duty to obtain a new loan refinancing the

underlying obligation was a condition precedent that had to be performed by Hall in order to create
a duty in Francisconi to deliver a Warranty Deed to Hall. Since Hall never obtained a new loan
refinancing the underlying obligation, she was never entitled to delivery of the Warranty Deed.
34.

By late November, 2003, Hall was in default under the terms of the Contract, in that

she had not made the June, 2002 payment, the Garbage Assessment due March, 2003, and the
November, 2003 payment.9
35.

On June 3 0,2004, Plaintiff gave written notice to Defendant that the Defendant was

in default. Pursuant to paragraph 14a of the contract, Plaintiff gave Defendant twenty (20) days as
stated in the Notice. In fact, Defendant had until August 9th, when Defendant was served with a
second Notice to cure the default. The Court concludes that the time given to Defendant to cure the
default was reasonable. See Johnson v. Austin, 748 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Utah 1988).
36.

Pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-36-3, and the delivery of the Notice on August 9,

2004, Defendant Hall was a tenant at will, and had the duty to remove herself from the premises
located at 1131 E Electra Lane, on or before August 14, 2004.
37.

As such, Francisconi was entitled to possession of the premises located at 1131

Electra Lane, commencing on August 15, 2004.
38.

Defendant Hall unlawful detained the premises located at 1131 Electra Lane, in

Sandy, Utah, from August 15, 2004, until her final removal on June 14, 2006.

9

As reference supra at T| 9 (referencing Plaintiffs Ex. 8, p.2) and again at f 14 and
accompanying notes, Hall may have actually been even greater default than as noted herein.
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39.

Pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-36-10, Plaintiff Francisconi is entitled to judgment

declaring the forefeiture of the Contract.
40.

Pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-36-10, Plaintiff is entitled to damages resulting

from the unlawful detainer of the premises. Pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-36-10(3) judgment
should enter against Defendant in the amount of the rental value of the property, for three time the
amount of damages assessed under subsection (2)(a) through (2)( c), and for reasonable attorney's
fees.
41.

Thus, the Court awards statutory damages in the amount of $500.00 for August, and

$ 1000.00 for September, October, November, December, 2004, times three, for a total of $13,500.00
for 2004. Additionally, the Court awards damages in the amount of $1,200.00 for each month in
2005, trebled, for a total of $43,200,00. Finally, the Court awards damages in the amount of
$1,200.00 for the months of January, February, March, April, May, of 2006, plus $700.00 for June,
trebled, for a 2006 total of $20,100.00. Therefore, the total statutory damage award is
$76,800.00.
42.

The Court rejects Francisconi's argument that under the terms of the Contract, she

is also entitled to keep the $3 0,000.00 which Hall contributed as down payment on the property. The
Contract explicitly provide that Seller covenanted to sell the property to Buyer for $91,500. The
undisputed evidence at trial was that the property actually cost $121,500.00 to purchase. Thus, it is
clear that Hall's $30,000.00 contribution was credited against the overall cost of the property before
the parties entered into the Contract. Thus, while Hall's subsequent default under the Contract led
her to forfeit all monies paid under the Contract, it did not result in Hall forfeiting her equitable
interest to the extent of her $30,000 contribution.
43.

The Court has carefully reviewed Hall's post-trial memorandum and the case law she

submitted in support of Hall's argument that by virtue of her $30,000.00 payment she was a legal
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co-tenant with Francisconi on the property and therefore could not be evicted from the property, even
after she failed to comply with the terms of the Contract. Defendant's Post-Trial Memorandum, at
8, 9. The Court rejects this argument. At no time was Hall officially a tenant-in-common with
Francisconi on the property. Although Hall's money was used for the down payment, she did not
obligate herself on the mortgage Note, and her credit (or lack thereof) apparently was not considered
in securing the mortgage. No evidence was presented at trial that Hall signed any documents
associated with the purchase of the Electra lane property from a third-party seller. The Court
concludes that the parties intended and agreed that Francisconi would be the sole purchaser and
owner of the property and, thereafter, Hall would purchase the property-at Francisconi's cost-by
complying with the terms of the Contract. To be sure, Hall immediately acquired a substantial
equitable interest in the property by virtue of the $30,000.00 of her money that was paid in
connection with that original purchase of the home. Utah courts recognize that buyers acquiring real
property through land-sale contracts acquire "equitable title" to the property. However, in order to
protect the seller from potential default by a buyer, the courts also recognize that the seller alone
retains the "legal title" until the terms of the land-sale contract are fulfilled.10 The Court concludes,
as a matter of law, that Hall's equitable interest in the Electra Lane home did not amount to a legal
co-tenancy with Francisconi.
44.

Based on the preceding analysis the Court concludes that in consideration of Hall's

equitable interest in the property, she should receive an offset in the amount of $30,000.00 against
the judgment to be entered against her. See, e.g., Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d at 1254 (recognizing
that judgments liens can attach to equitable real estate interests created pursuant to land sale

10

See Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1255(Utah 1987)("the vendor's retention of the
legal title is usually coupled with a contract right to forfeit the vendee's interest and to take back
the vendee's interests if the vendee defaults"), citing Cutright v. Union Savings & Invest. Co., 33
Utah 486, 94 P. 984(1908).
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contracts). However, because Hall defaulted in her obligations under the Contract, the Court further
holds that she is not entitled to further credit to account for any appreciated value of the property,
if any. Cf Id. at 1256 (concluding that a vendee under a land-sale contract is entitled to the
appreciated value of the property over the contract purchase price as long as [the vendee's] interest
has not been forfeited).
45.

As the prevailing party in this case, and pursuant to the Contract terms and Utah Code

§78-36-10(3) (2006), the Court awards Francisconi the reasonable attorney's fees requested in the
Affidavit of Gregory M. Constantino submitted at trial, plus the subsequent Affidavit(s) of Gregory
M. Constantino establishing the reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Plaintiff on January 3,2007,
and thereafter in this matter.
46.

The Court also awards the Plaintiff her court costs as established by a memorandum

of costs filed with the Court.
47.

Finally, the Court orders that the possession bond paid into the Court by Francisconi

be released to her or her agent.
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